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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. : 
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ, : Case No. 20040633-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. : Respondent is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals in State v. Valdez. 2004 UT App 214, 95 P.3d 291, cert, granted. 106 P.3d 743 
(Utah 2004). See Order dated November 5, 2004. The court of appeals' opinion in 
Valdez is attached hereto as Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: "Whether a Batson challenge may be deemed timely if the jury has been 
sworn and the remainder of the venire excused." Order dated November 5, 2004. 
Issue II: "Whether the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a Batson 
analysis and the correct standard of review on appeal." Id. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of 
appeals and not that of the district court." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,^25, 63 P.3d 
650 (quotation and citation omitted). This Court reviews "the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness.11 IdL (quotation and citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and rule 18 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure are determinative of this appeal. See Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS * 
Anthony James Valdez (Valdez) was charged with one count each of aggravated 
burglary, possession of a firearm by a restricted person, aggravated assault, child abuse, 
and criminal mischief. Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at Tfl;R. 2-4; 35-38. On October 29, 
2002, the trial court conducted voir dire to select a jury for Valdez's trial. Valdez. 2004 
UT App 214 at ^|2; R. 94; 209. The venire consisted of eleven men and fourteen women. 
R. 94. Each venireperson had at least a high school education. R. 209:10-32. Eight men 
and nine women were or had been married; five men and twelve women had children; 
five men and eleven women subscribed to a newspaper; o ne woman subscribed to a 
hunting magazine; one man and two women subscribed to Sports Illustrated; two men 
and one woman subscribed to outdoors magazines; eight men and eleven women were 
employed; and three men and five women enjoyed outdoor activities. IdL Four women 
had heard of the case. IdL at 34-35. Of these four women, one served on the jury, one 
was struck for cause, and two were struck by the State. R. 94. 
1
 The underlying facts of this case are not relevant to determining the issues on 
certiorari review. See Pet. Br. at 9. 
2 
Lynda Valerio (Valerio) responded to the questionnaire by saying: 
I'm an office manager for a nonprofit agency called the 
[Brain] Injury Association of Utah. I also train individuals 
with sustained brain injuries to return to employment. 
I have a high school education with some trade 
schooling classes that I've taken. My husband's name is 
Chris. He is a customer service representative with a cell 
phone company here in Salt Lake. We have two children, 
one will be five in two weeks and a daughter that is 16 
months old. My husband gets Sports Illustrated and that's the 
only magazine or newspaper we get. Hobbies, I enjoy 
camping and any outdoor activities, any crafts, ceramics and 
things like that. 
R. 209:14-15. Responding to the trial court's questions about the nonprofit agency, 
Valerio said "We apply for grants so that we can provide services for these individuals 
but we are the only agency brain injury association in the state of Utah, so we serve the 
whole state for resources"; "If an individual is in need of housing, medical assistance, 
anything like that, we do refer them out to professionals that can help them"; and "[W]e 
help them to get connected with independent living skills." IcL_ at 15-16. 
Joyce Gonzalez (Gonzalez) responded to the questionnaire by saying: 
I'm trying to retire as housekeeping. And I have a high 
school level education. And my spouse's name is Jessie and 
he retired from Hercules. And I have three children, 45, 43 
and 41, a daughter and two sons. And we take the Tribune 
and just craft magazines. And my hobbies, we have a cabin 
at Scofield Reservoir that takes up a lot of our time in the 
summer, and my grandchildren. 
Id at 18-19. Responding to the court's questions, Gonzalez said she had four 
grandchildren and she "clean[ed] houses for [her] children" but was trying to quit. IcL. at 
3 
19. Gonzalez was questioned in chambers because she said she had heard of the case. R. 
209:65. Defense counsel asked her what she remembered. Id_ Gonzalez remembered 
"hearing about the break-in in the area," and asked, "Was it Ensign Avenue?" Id, 
Defense counsel responded, "Emery Street." Id. Gonzalez said, "Emery Street? It's just 
very vague because I just remember the name and the incident." Id. at 66. Next, defense 
counsel asked, "That's all you remember is that there was a break-in?" Id^ Gonzalez 
responded, "Exactly, yeah." Id Then defense counsel asked, "Are you sure that it's this 
incident we're talking about?" Id. Gonzalez said, "I think it is. Like I say, I read the 
newspaper every day, and it just sounded familiar to me." Id. Finally, the trial court 
asked, "Do you believe that you could . . . just weigh what is presented to you in court?" 
Id. Gonzalez responded, "I think I could, uh-huh." Id. 
Tamara Thornton (Thornton) responded to the questionnaire as follows: 
I work at Thornton Plumbing and Heating, I've worked there 
about 20 years and I do payroll and benefits. Two years of 
college. My husband's name is Clay and he is an owner at 
Thornton Plumbing and Heating. We have three children, 20, 
17 and 13. Deseret News comes to our home and Popular 
Science and such like that. Hobbies, I enjoy reading and take 
Irish folk dancing classes, things like that. 
R. 209:14. Responding to the trial court's questions, Thornton explained Irish folk 
dancing is "like river dance but I'm just a beginner, so I'm not going to do any 
demonstrations"; the family business has "58 employees" and is "a third-generation 
company"; and the family business is "usually a subcontractor" with a "specialty" in "the 
4 
radiant." IdL When asked about prior jury service, Thornton said she had served on a 
criminal case eight years ago where the jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. 
Id. at 49-50. The trial court asked, "Anything about that experience you believe would 
affectyour ability to serve on this jury?" Id. at 50. Thornton answered, "No." Id_ Later, 
Thornton was questioned in chambers because she said she had heard about the case. IcL 
at 58. Defense counsel asked, "What do you remember hearing?" IdL Thornton replied, 
"I don't have a real strong memory of it, I just vaguely remember the name seemed 
familiar and that there was an individual broke into a home, and I just really don't 
remember a lot about it." Id Next, defense counsel asked, "Are you sure that this case 
was the one you're thinking about in the news?" Id. Thornton answered, "I guess I'm not 
100 percent sure." IcL Then, the trial court asked if she "would have any problem with 
weighing only the matters you hear in court?" IdL at 59. Thornton replied, "No." Id. 
Paula Morely (Morely) responded to the questionnaire by saying: 
I work part time for Jordan School District and I give piano 
lessons in my home. I have a college degree, a bachelor's. 
My spouse's name is Russell, he is a store manager for the 
Deseret Book Company. We have five children, one of 
whom is deceased. The others are 23, 20, 16 and 14 years 
old. We take the Readers Digest and the Deseret News at our 
home and Sports Illustrated for the boys. My hobbies include 
music, baking[,] outdoors things with my family, camping 
and going to football games and things. 
R. 209:27. Responding to the trial court's questions, Morely said she watched "BYU" 
football, and worked in "a federal program to help boost the reading and math levels" in 
5 
a "computer lab" in "an elementary school." IcL at 27-28. 
In chambers, defense counsel asked venireperson Peggy Curtis (Curtis), "You said 
you may have heard this case in the news?" Id at 61. Curtis replied: 
Like I said, I read the newspaper quite thoroughly but, again, 
I don't remember details. I do remember- . . . when you were 
reading over the charges it seemed in my mind I remembered 
something about with the child abuse. It seems like there 
wasn't an abuse on the child but the child was present or 
something when there was some alleged abuse of a mother or 
a female or something.... Again, I don't remember 
anything, you know, other than that kind of-because I guess I 
remember thinking, yeah, it's a first time I guess . . . thinking 
that child abuse can be something that the child endures 
visually or something as opposed to the physical. 
Id. The trial court asked Curtis if she could weigh only evidence "that comes in during 
the court proceeding," and Curtis responded, "I believe I can, yes." Id. at 61-62. The 
trial court struck six venirepersons for cause, leaving eight men and eleven women. R. 
94. The State then used its four peremptory challenges to strike four women: Valerio, 
Gonzalez, Thornton, and Morely. IcL Curtis served on the jury. IcL 
Following jury selection, Valdez objected to the State's use of its peremptory 
challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at 
Tf2; R. 209:78. In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under 
Batson, Valdez's counsel noted that the State used all four of its peremptory strikes to 
exclude women from the jury. IcL In response, the "State did not argue that Valdez had 
failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination, but instead argued Valdez's Batson 
6 
challenge was untimely." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at Tf3;R. 209:78. Without 
addressing timeliness, the trial court ordered the State to explain its challenges. Id. The 
State explained its challenges as follows: 
The State chose to strike Ms. Valerio because she stated that 
she worked for a nonprofit brain injury type of place. That is 
not a basis upon which to strike her [for cause], but I felt her 
responses lined up in a way that would make her not a helpful 
[juror] for the State and that she would be somewhat overly 
compassionate. 
The second [juror] was Ms. Gonzalez. She had heard 
of the case and seemed — though she said that it wouldn't 
bother her, her responses to me seemed matter of fact and I 
felt like her responses would not make her a good juror for 
the State. 
Ms. Thornton had also heard of the case and I don't 
recall what it was, there was something that I immediately 
decided that I would make her one of my strikes. She'd also 
been on a jury and he was found guilty of a manslaughter, 
which I thought was probably a one-step reduction, at least 
that's the assumption. So again, I felt like she was not going 
to be a helpful one for the State. 
The last one I agonized over whether to strike, No. 19, 
Paula Morely or 21 Ron Hardy, I conferred with my 
colleague,... and we talked about it and she brought to my 
attention he was a hunter and that she felt like a hunter would 
know things about guns and brought that point about that 
potential juror and another one. And after conferring with 
her I changed my mind and went with [her] — and that was 
simply — she was simply towards the end. I suppose there 
was also it felt like she was not strong, not — I'm sorry, I'm 
trying to read my notes here.. . . 
There was this pattern of « her responses made me 
think she would be somebody, again, that might be willing to 
let bygones be bygones, what I would say overly 
compassionate, and it was just based on her responses about 
position, her responses to little subtle things like her teaching 
piano lessons and the magazines she chose. We don't have a 
7 
lot to base these things on, so that's how I made those 
choices. 
Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at 1J3 (quoting R. 209:79-80) (first alteration in original). The 
trial court accepted the State's explanations and overruled Valdez's objection. Valdez . 
2004 UT App 214 at P ; R. 209:80; see. Addendum C. 
"During the jury trial, the victim recanted her accusation against Valdez." Valdez . 
2004 UT App 214 at f l ; R. 210:55-79. "The State called an expert in Battered Women 
Syndrom[e] (BWS) to explain why many victims of abuse recant their accusation against 
their abuser." Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at ^4; R. 211:100-109. "Valdez objected to the 
testimony, but the district court overruled the objection." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at 
1J4; R. 59-62; 80-83; 147-64; 208. "The jury found Valdez guilty of aggravated burglary, 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and criminal mischief." 
Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at [^4; R. 133-35; 138-46. On January 13, 2003, the trial court 
sentenced Valdez to consecutive terms of five years to life in prison for aggravated 
burglary, and one to fifteen years in prison for possession of a firearm. R. 179-80. The 
trial court also sentenced Valdez to six months in jail for criminal mischief. Id. Valdez 
filed a notice of appeal on January 30, 2003. R. 184-85. 
On appeal, Valdez challenged the trial court's "ruling that the State offered 
nondiscriminatory reasons for its use of peremptory strikes." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 
at Tf5. In response, the State argued Valdez's Batson challenge was procedurally barred 
because it was not timely or preserved. Id at ^ 7 , 12. On the merits, the State conceded 
8 
step one of the Batson test, but challenged steps two and three. Id. at ^[19-20. The court 
of appeals rejected the State's procedural claims. Id_ at Tfl[5-13. First, it rejected the 
timeliness claim because rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure "allows Batson 
challenges . . . 'before any of the evidence is presented"1 if the court finds good cause. 
IcL at j^l 1 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2)). Here, the trial court implicitly found good 
cause by "ignoring the State's timeliness argument and requiring the parties to proceed 
directly to arguments on the merits." Id at {^10 (citing State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 
776 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)). Second, the court rejected 
the preservation claim because "there is no clear rule [in Utah] requiring a defendant to 
renew a Batson objection." Id. at ^[13. "Rather, Utah courts do 'not require a party to 
continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a 
decision on the issue.'" Id (quoting State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4,Tfl4, 20 P.3d 265). 
The court of appeals then observed that the State conceded step one of the Batson 
test and decided the merits under step two. Id. at ^[20-30. Initially, the court determined 
the correct standard of review for step two is abuse of discretion because step two "seems 
less like a factual issue because the trial court does not weigh evidence, but instead looks 
to the face of the State's explanations," and the "trial court's examination of the facial 
neutrality of the State's explanation also considers the general context of the case and the 
specific issues involved." Id. at [^17 (citations omitted). Thus, "because each case may 
turn on different issues, or even subtly different nuances," the trial court must be allowed 
9 
"discretion." IcL at TJ15. Applying this standard, the court of appeals held step two was 
not met. Id at ^26. The court of appeals analyzed step two by considering whether the 
prosecutor's explanations were "'"(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear 
and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate."5" Id at «|21 (citing State v. Cannon, 2002 
UT App 18,TJ9, 41 P.3d 1153). Specifically, the court held the State's explanation that it 
struck "Jurors Morely and Valerio" because they were "'overly compassionate"1 and 
Gonzalez because she "was 'matter of fact,'" was "not reasonably clear and specific." IcL 
at ^[26-27. This failure was "sufficient in itself to reverse the trial court's treatment of 
the State's peremptory strike." IdL at ^27. The court of appeals also noted the State's 
explanations "were unrelated to the case" and were not legitimate. IcL at ^[28-29. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm because Utah law says a Batson challenge may be 
deemed timely if raised after the jury has been sworn and the remainder of the venire 
excused. Whether a Batson objection is timely depends on local practices. The local 
practice in Utah says a defendant must raise a Batson objection before the jury is sworn 
or, for good cause, before any of the evidence is presented, and a trial court implicitly 
finds good cause by allowing counsel to proceed with their Batson arguments and ruling 
on the merits. In this case, the court of appeals correctly applied the local practice. 
Next, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals applied the correct 
criteria for each step of Batson's test. First, the court of appeals applied the correct 
10 
criteria for step one. The State concedes it waived the issue of whether Valdez made a 
prima facie showing. Second, the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for step 
two. The Supreme Court has said a step two explanation need not be persuasive, but 
must be facially neutral, legitimate, clear and reasonably specific, and related to the case 
to be tried ("Batson's step two requirements"). Following this guidance, the court of 
appeals held the step two explanation need not be persuasive, but must meet Batson 's 
step two requirements. Third, the court of appeals correctly declined to proceed to step 
three. This Court should not address this issue because it is not part of the issue on 
certiorari. Regardless, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals correctly 
held the State's explanations did not satisfy step two. Fourth, even if the court of appeals 
applied the incorrect criteria for a step two analysis, it would have reached the same 
conclusion under step three. Under step two, the court of appeals reviewed the trial 
court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. Had the court of appeals proceeded to step 
three and applied a clearly erroneous standard, it would have conducted a similar analysis 
and reached the same conclusion. 
Finally, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals applied the correct 
standards of review. First, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review to 
step one. Following this Court's guidance, the court of appeals reviewed step one for 
abuse of discretion. Second, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review 
to step two. Step two requires a trial court to look to the face of the State's explanation, 
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and consider the general context of the case and the specific issues involved. Thus, it is a 
mixed question of fact and law and should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Third, 
the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review to step three. This Court and 
the Supreme Court have held step three is reviewed for clear error. Following this case 
law, the court of appeals held step three is reviewed for clear error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE UTAH LAW SAYS A 
BATSON CHALLENGE MAY BE DEEMED TIMELY IF RAISED 
AFTER THE JURY HAS BEEN SWORN AND THE REMAINDER 
OF THE VENIRE EXCUSED 
Under Batson, an objection to a peremptory strike must be timely to preserve the 
issue for appeal. See Batson. 476 U.S. at 99-100 (allowing local timeliness rules to bar 
Batson challenges); Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (stating, in context ofBatson challenge, "[i]t is axiomatic that, before a party may 
advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show that it was timely presented to 
the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon" (citation omitted)); 
Vaklez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^7. "Issues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion 
are deemed waived, precluding this court from considering their merits on appeal." 
Cadston, 776 P.2d at 655; see Valdez 2004 UT App 214 at [^7. 
Whether a defendant's Batson objection is timely depends entirely on "local 
practices." Ford v. Georgia. 498 U.S. 411, 423 (1991) (citing Batson. 476 U.S. at 99 
n.24); see Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at \I. A "state court may adopt a general rule that a 
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Batson claim is untimely if it is raised for the first time on appeal, or after the jury is 
sworn, or before its members are selected." Ford, 498 U.S. at 423. However, a state may 
not use its rule to declare a Batson issue waived unless the rule is a "firmly established 
and regularly followed state practice." James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51 (1984); 
see Ford, 498 U.S. at 424 (holding court cannot prevent review of Batson claim by 
applying "rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial"); Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 
146, 149 (1964) (holding state rules "not strictly or regularly followed" may not bar 
review); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958) ("Novelty in procedural 
requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those 
who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their 
federal constitutional rights."); Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^|13. For example, in 
NAACP, the Supreme Court declined to apply a state rule that would have prevented 
review of a due process claim, even though the state rule appeared "in retrospect to form 
part of a consistent pattern of procedures," because the defendant could not be "deemed 
to have been apprised of [the rule's] existence." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 457. 
In Utah, the firmly-established and regularly-followed rule for determining the 
timeliness of aBatson objection is rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776 (holding rule 18 is applicable to "constitutionally-grounded 
objections] to the State's peremptory challenges"); Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^[9. 
Rule 18 says, "A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is 
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sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after 
the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented." Utah R. Crim. P. 
18(c)(2). The only Utah case directly discussing the timeliness of Batson objections is 
Harrison. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. In Harrison, the defendant objected 
immediately after the jury was sworn. IcL In response, the trial court asked the 
prosecutor to explain its peremptory strikes, accepted the prosecutor's explanation, and 
overruled the defendant's objection. Id. On appeal, the court of appeals held the 
defendant's objection was timely under rule 18 because the defendant objected before 
any evidence was presented and the trial court made an implicit finding of good cause by 
"allowing counsel to proceed with their arguments." Id. Utah's other Batson cases, 
while not directly addressing timeliness, also comport with rule 18. See State v. 
Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363,^ }3, 58 P.3d 867 (reaching merits where Batson objection not 
raised until after jury sworn); Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 (same); Cariston, 776 P.2d at 
655 (holding Batson objection waived because defendant did not object "until after the 
return of an adverse verdict"); Addendum D. 
Thus, rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison, creates the following timeliness rule for 
Batson objections in Utah. A defendant must raise his Batson objection before the jury is 
sworn or, for good cause, before any of the evidence is presented. Utah R. Crim. P. 
18(c)(2). A trial court implicitly finds good cause by allowing counsel to proceed with 
their Batson arguments and ruling on the merits of the Batson claim. Harrison, 805 P.2d 
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at 776. Because this rule represents Utah's only guidance for determining the timeliness 
of a Batson objection, it is the rule that should be applied to determine the timeliness of 
Valdez's Batson objection. See Ford, 498 U.S. at 424 (holding court cannot prevent 
review of Batson claim by applying "rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial"). 
Moreover, rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison, is an appropriate rule for 
determining the timeliness of Batson objections because it comports with Supreme Court 
case law and Utah's general preservation requirement. First, the Supreme Court has said 
a "state court may adopt a general rule that a Batson claim is untimely if it is raised for 
the first time on appeal, or after the jury is sworn, or before its members are selected." 
Ford, 498 U.S. at 423. Rule 18 falls directly within these boundaries. See. Utah R. Crim. 
P. 18(c)(2). The Supreme Court has also said, "The fact that the [trial] court reviewed 
petitioner's [Batson] claim on the merits . . . presupposes the claim's timeliness." Ford, 
498 U.S. at 421. This supports Harrison's holding that a trial court implicitly finds good 
cause by allowing counsel to proceed with their Batson arguments and ruling on the 
merits of the Batson claim. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. 
Second, Utah's general preservation requirement exists because "the trial court 
ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct 
it," and "a defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the 
strategy of enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy 
fails,. . . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 
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74/fll 1, 10 P.3d 346 (quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, an 
issue is preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an 
opportunity to rule on the issue.'"" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 
129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). Like Utah's general preservation 
requirement, rule 18 assures that a trial court will be given the opportunity to address a 
claimed Batson error and that a defendant cannot strategically hide a Batson objection to 
enhance his chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, claim error on appeal. 
See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776 (noting Batson claim, raised eifter jury sworn, was timely 
because defendant "met the requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his 
constitutional objection in the trial court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)). 
In this case, the court of appeals correctly applied Utah's timeliness rule and held 
Valdez's objection was timely. Valdez's Batson objection complied with rule 18 as 
interpreted by Harrison. SeeValdez, 2004 UT App 214 at 1fl[7-ll; R. 209:78. Valdez 
objected to the State's peremptory strikes "before any of the evidence [was] presented." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2); see R. 209:78. Then, as in Harrison, the trial court implicitly 
found good cause "by allowing counsel to proceed with their arguments" and ruling on 
the merits of Valdez's objection. Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776; see Ford, 498 U.S. at 421 
(holding "fact that the [trial] court reviewed petitioner's [Batson] claim on the merits . . . 
presupposes the claim's timeliness"); R. 209:78. Thus, the court of appeals correctly 
held Valdez's objection was timely. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at t l 1 ("Thus, in the 
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absence of any firmer and more established authority on the subject, we could not 
prevent appellate review of Valdez's constitutional claim due to lack of timeliness."). To 
hold otherwise would have impermissibly denied Valdez review of his Batson objection. 
See Ford. 498 U.S. at 424. Moreover, by complying with rule 18 as interpreted by 
Harrison. Valdez satisfied Utah's general preservation requirement because his objection 
allowed the trial court to rule on the Batson issue, and prevented him from strategically 
hiding his Batson challenge to enhance his chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy 
failed, claiming error on appeal. See Holgate. 2000 UT 74 at^fll; R. 209:78. 
In its opening brief, the State concedes that the court of appeals was bound to 
follow Utah's "procedural practice" when deciding the timeliness of Valdez's objection. 
Pet. Br. at 12-13. It complains, however, that no other jurisdictions allow Batson 
objections "after the trial jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire excused." IcL_ at 
13 (citations omitted). Contrary to the State's claim, other jurisdictions can and do allow 
Batson objections after the jury is sworn. See, e.g.. Ford. 498 U.S. at 423 (holding "state 
court may adopt a general rule that a Batson claim is untimely if it is raised for the first 
time on appeal, or after the jury is sworn, or before its members are selected"); Lewis v. 
Commonwealth. 492 S.E.2d 492, 493 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding local rule "allows a 
Batson motion to be made after the jury is sworn, but only with leave of court"). 
Besides, it does not matter what procedural practice other jurisdictions engage in. See 
James. 466 U.S. at 348-51. In Utah, the only firmly-established timeliness rule for 
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Batson objections is rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2); 
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. Thus, the court of appeals correctly based its timeliness ruling 
on rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison, and left a possible change in Utah's timeliness rule 
to "be addressed by an amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Valdez, 
2004UTApp214at^ | l l&n. l . 
The State also argues the court of appeals erred by applying rule 18 to Valdez's 
Batson objection because rule 18 is "not controlling." Pet. Br. at 19. First, the State 
claims rule 18 is not controlling because it "imposes the time limit for challenging the 
retention of a juror," not "an objection to the removal of a juror." Id. (emphasis in 
original). The State's argument is without distinction. Rule 18 governs when a 
peremptory strike can be made. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2). A Batson objection 
challenges a peremptory strike and, accordingly, cannot be made until after the 
peremptory strike has been made. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82. Thus, Batson objections, 
like peremptory strikes, are permitted "for good cause" at any time "after the juror is 
sworn but before any of the evidence is presented." Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2). 
Second, the State claims that Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16(1) (2002), rather than 
rule 18, is controlling. Pet. Br. at 18. This Court should decline to consider this 
argument because the State did not raise the argument before either lower court or in its 
petition for a writ of certiorari. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) ("Only the questions set 
forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."); 
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Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,ffi[12-16, 48 P.3d 968 
(declining to review issue on certiorari unless properly preserved for appeal); State v. 
Cram, 2002 UT 37,TJ6, 46 P.3d 230 (same); Thurston v. Box Elder County , 892 P.2d 
1034, 1037 n.2 (Utah 1995) (noting "lower court ruling becomes binding on a higher 
court through failure of the parties to preserve an issue for review" (citations omitted)). 
Besides, by its own concessions, this argument fails. See. Pet. Br. at 18, 20. The State 
concedes this Court and the court of appeals have both expressly held section 78-46-
16(1) "does not govern constitutionally-based challenges, such as Batson ." kL at 18, 20 
(citations omitted). It also concedes that Harrison expressly held rule 18fs time frame 
applies to Batson objections. IcL at 20 (citation omitted). Thus, the applicability of 
section 78-46-16(1) is inapposite in this case because the clear timeliness rule at the time 
of Valdez's objection was rule 18 as interpreted by Harrison. See Ford, 498 U.S. at 424. 
Next, the State argues the court of appeals erred in holding Valdez's objection met 
rule 18's good cause requirement. Pet. Br. at 21-22. First, the State proposes a definition 
of good cause adopted in In re Rights to Use of Water, 2004 UT 106,^43, 110 P.3d 666. 
This definition of good cause, however, applies to requests for retroactive extensions for 
filing motions, not to the timeliness of a Batson objection. See kL at ^42-43. Instead, 
this Court should look to Harrison, which defines good cause as used in rule 18. 
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776 (holding trial court "implicitly" found good cause "by allowing 
counsel to proceed with their arguments"); see. Ford, 498 U.S. at 421 ("The fact that the 
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[trial] court reviewed petitioner's [Batson] claim on the merits . . . presupposes the 
claim's timeliness."). To hold otherwise, would impermissibly deny Valdez the 
opportunity to raise his Batson challenge on appeal. See id. at 424. 
Second, the State claims this case is distinguishable from Harrison because, by 
allowing the parties to proceed with their arguments and overruling Valdez's Batson 
objection on the merits, the trial court did not implicitly find good cause, but simply 
"believed it was best to make a record of the merits." Pet. Br. at 22 (citing State v. 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 458 n.8 (Utah 1994)). Alvarez, however, is distinguishable. In 
Alvarez, there was no question of whether the defendant's Batson objection was timely. 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 458 n.8. Instead, the trial court ruled the defendant failed to 
establish a prima facie case and "requested that the prosecutor put on his race-neutral 
reasons for excluding jurors" simply to facilitate the appeal. IcL_ Conversely, here, the 
trial court asked the prosecutor to explain his challenges not to facilitate the appeal but to 
make a ruling based on the prosecutor's explanation. R. 209:78-79. Thus, this case is 
comparable to Harrison, where the trial court's act of asking the prosecutor to explain the 
challenges, accepting the prosecutor's explanation and denying the defendant's objection 
was an implicit finding of good cause. See_ Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. 
Third, the State claims Harrison is distinguishable because the trial court did not 
have discretion to find good cause since Valdez "did not claim good cause" existed. Pet. 
Br. at 22. Valdez, however, had no reason to argue good cause existed because the trial 
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court reached the merits of his Batson objection. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^jlO-11; 
see Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776. Besides, "Utah courts do 'not require a party to continue 
to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a decision on the 
issue.'" Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at [^13 (quoting Hoffhine . 2001 UT 4 at T[14). 
Finally, the State complains the timing of Valdez's objection forced the prosecutor 
to base his explanation on his memory and his notes, which were "unreadable." Pet. Br. 
at 36. However, because the Utah rule allows a defendant to make a Batson objection at 
any time before evidence is presented, the prosecutor should have protected himself by 
taking legible notes. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2); Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 
(2d Cir. 1992) ("Prosecutors would be well advised - when contemplating striking a 
jurors for reasons of demeanor - to make contemporaneous notes as to the specific 
behavior on the prospective juror's part that renders such person unsuitable for service 
on a particular case."). Besides, not so much time passed that the prosecutor would have 
had difficulty remembering the reasons for his peremptory strikes. See R. 209:70-78. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS WHETHER VALDEZ 
PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS BATSON CLAIM 
Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure says "[ojnly the questions set 
forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court." 
Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). This Court should not address the State's preservation 
argument because it is not part of the issue on certiorari review. In the court of appeals, 
the State argued Valdez did not preserve his Batson claim. See Valdez, 2004 UT App 
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214 at ^12. The court of appeals rejected this argument. S^e. id at ^12-13. In its 
petition for a writ of certiorari, the State did not challenge the court of appeals5 rejection 
of its preservation argument. See Cert. Pet. at 5-14. Accordingly, this Court did not 
grant certiorari to decide whether the court of appeals correctly held Valdez's argument 
was preserved. See Order dated November 5, 2004. Instead, this Court granted 
certiorari to decide "[w]hether a Batson challenge may be deemed timely if the jury has 
been sworn and the remainder of the venire excused," and "[w]hether the court of 
appeals applied the correct criteria for a Batson analysis and the correct standard of 
review on appeal." IcL Thus, because preservation is not part of the issue on certiorari 
review, this Court should decline to address the State's preservation argument. 
Besides, the court of appeals properly rejected the State's preservation argument. 
In the court of appeals, the State argued Valdez did not preserve his Batson objection 
because, although he objected "to the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike 
women from the jury," he did not later "challenge the validity of the prosecutor's 
explanations for the strikes." See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at 1J12. The court of 
appeals explained that Utah has "no clear rule requiring a defendant to renew a Batson 
objection or to object specifically to the State's offered explanations." IdL at f 13 
(quoting Ford, 498 U.S. at 424). "Rather, Utah courts do 'not require a party to continue 
to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a decision on the 
issue.'" Id (quoting Hoffhme, 2001 UT 4 at 1J14); see State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 336-
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43 (Utah 1991) (reaching merits of Batson claim where defendant did not renew 
objection); State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153, 155-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same); 
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 773, 778 (same); State v. Maciah 854 P.2d 543, 544-47 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (same). Thus, Valdez preserved his Batson issue for appeal because he 
"objected to the State's use of peremptory challenges, thereby preventing any claim that 
he strategically hid his objection until after obtaining an unsatisfactory result." Valdez, 
2004 UT App 214 at 1J13 : see Holgate. 2000 UT 74 at 111. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT CRITERIA FOR A BATSON 
ANALYSIS 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution "prohibits discrimination injury selection on the basis of gender, or on the 
assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than 
the fact that the person happens to be a woman." J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 
(1994). To determine whether a peremptory strike violates equal protection, this Court 
and the Supreme Court have adopted a three-step test. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98 
(outlining test in racial discrimination case); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 128-29 (holding Batson's 
equal protection principles "apply equally to gender discrimination"); State v. Cantu, 778 
P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) (applying test to racial discrimination case); Harrison, 805 
P.2d at 776 (applying test to gender discrimination case). First, "the opponent of a 
peremptory challenge" must "ma[ke] out a prima facie case of [gender] discrimination." 
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State v. ColwelL 2000 UT 8,TJ17, 994 P.2d 177 (citations omitted). Second, "the burden 
of production shifts" and "the proponent of the strike" must "come forward with a 
[gender]-neutral explanation." Id. (citations omitted). Third, "[i]f a [genderj-neutral 
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the 
strike has proved purposeful [gender] discrimination." Id. (citations omitted). 
In its decision, the court of appeals applied this three-step test and held the State's 
peremptory strikes violated equal protection. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ffl[18-19. The 
question on certiorari is whether the court of appeals applied the correct criteria to each 
step. See Order dated November 5, 2004. This Court should affirm because the court of 
appeals applied the correct criteria to each step of the Batson test. First, the court of 
appeals applied the correct criteria for analyzing steps one and two. See Sections A; B. 
Second, because the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a step two analysis 
and concluded the State's explanations were not gender-neutral, the court of appeals 
correctly declined to proceed to step three. See. Section C. Third, even if the court of 
appeals applied the incorrect criteria for a step two analysis, it ultimately would have 
reached the same conclusion under step Ihree. See Section D. 
A, The Court of Appeals Applied the Correct Criteria For a Step One Analysis. 
"Where the proponent of the peremptory challenge fails to contest the sufficiency 
of the prima facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal explanation for the 
challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie case was established is waived." State v. 
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Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted); see Hernandez v. 
New York. 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (holding once State has offered race-neutral 
explanation and court has ruled on question of discrimination, issue of whether 
defendant made prima facie showing is moot); Colwell. 2000 UT 8 at f 18 (same); 
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at [^8 (same); Chatwin. 2002 UT App 363 at TJ9 (same). In this 
case, the State waived the issue of whether a prima facie case was established. When 
defense counsel objected to the State's peremptory strikes, the State did not insist Valdez 
establish a prima facie case. R. 209:78-80. Instead, it accepted Valdez's statement that 
he had shown Ma pattern of [discrimination] based on gender," and offered an 
explanation. Icl On appeal, the State conceded "that it waived the issue of whether 
Valdez presented a prima facie case of discrimination." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at 
TJ20. Thus, the court of appeals correctly proceeded to step two of the Batson test. Id. 
In its brief, the State concedes that the court of appeals correctly proceeded to step 
two because it waived the issue of whether Valdez made a prima facie showing. Pet. Br. 
at 27. Regardless, the State argues the court of appeals erred "in its step one analysis" 
because it failed "to recognize that the weakness or strength of the prima facie showing . 
. . remains relevant for step three." LI In this case, however, the court of appeals did not 
reach step three because it decided the case under step two. See Valdez, 2004 UT App 
214 at lflj20, 30. Thus, it could not have erred by failing to consider Valdez's prima facie 
case in step three because it did not conduct a step three analysis. IcL The State also 
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argues the court of appeals erred by failing to acknowledge that Valdez's prima facie 
case was "weak." Pet. Br. at 28. Again, this argument ignores the fact that the court of 
appeals had no reason to measure the strength of Valdez's prima facie case because the 
State waived this issue and the court of atppeals did not reach step three of the Batson 
test. See Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at ^ 2 0 , 30. 
Besides, Valdez established a strong prima facie case. "To establish a prima facie 
case, a defendant must demonstrate facts and circumstances that raise the necessary 
inference of purposeful discrimination." Alvarez., 872 P.2d at 455 (citation omitted). In 
this case, the State used 100 percent of ils peremptory strikes against women. R. 94. By 
striking women, the State exhibited a pattern of striking members of a cognizable group. 
See Span, 819 P.2d at 341 (defining cognizable group as "recognizable, distinct class, 
singled out for different treatment" (citation omitted)). This pattern alone is sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (holding pattern of striking 
members of cognizable group may give rise to inference of discrimination); Alvarez. 872 
P.2d at 457 ("Numerical evidence alone may be sufficient to establish a pattern of 
peremptory strikes against minority jurors, but a defendant must show that 'his opponent 
has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used 
a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group'"). The fact that four 
women survived the State's challenges does not excuse the State's pattern of striking 
women. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 n. 13 (holding "possibility that members of both 
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genders will get on the jury despite the intentional discrimination is beside the point" 
because the "exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and 
undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system"). 
Moreover, Valdez's prima facie case was strengthened by the underlying facts of 
the case. First, Valdez was accused of domestic violence, which invokes gender-related 
issues and requires careful scrutiny. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 (holding gender 
discrimination "during jury selection 'invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality 
and its obligation to adhere to the law'"; this "potential for cynicism is particularly acute 
in cases where gender-related issues are prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual 
harassment, or paternity" (citation omitted)). Second, the alleged victim and all but one 
of the State's witnesses were women and Valdez, the defendant, was a man.2 R. 210-11. 
Thus, the State had an incentive to strike women because they would be more judgmental 
of the contradictory stories of the State's female witnesses. See. State v. Call 508 S.E.2d 
496, 510 (N.C. 1998) (holding one factor in evaluating whether prima facie case has 
been established is "gender of the defendant, the victim and any key witnesses"). 
R The Court of Appeals Applied the Correct Criteria For a Step Two Analysis. 
Once the defendant has made out a prima facie case of gender discrimination, the 
State must "come forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation." Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at 
2
 The only male witness to testify was Officer Thirston Beger, whose testimony 
dealt with the information Jiminez told him after the alleged crime. R. 211:97-100. 
27 
Tfl7 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has said this step "does not demand an 
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible." Purkett v. Elem. 514 U.S. 765, 768 
(1995). Rather, to be deemed neutral, the State's explanation need only "articulate a 
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried," and "give a 'clear and 
reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges" 
("Batson's step two requirements"). Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20 (quoting Texas Dept. 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)). Batson 's step two 
requirements do not assess the "persuasiveness" of the explanation. Purkett. 514 U.S. at 
769. They simply prevent the prosecutor from satisfying step two "by merely denying 
that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith." I&_ In other 
words, a "'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not 
deny equal protection." Id. (citations omitted). 
Requiring the State's step two explanation to satisfy Batson's step two 
requirements is appropriate because it ensures the defendant will have the information 
necessary to carry his burden, and the trial court will have the information necessary to 
conduct a step three analysis. First, requiring the State to provide a step two explanation 
that meets Batson's step two requirements guarantees the defendant will receive the 
information necessary to show, if true, that the State's peremptory strike violated equal 
protection. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58. In Burdine, the Supreme Court applied the 
Batson test to determine whether an employer's act of firing an employee violated equal 
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protection. Id. at 250-51. There, it reasoned that the employer's step two explanation 
need not be persuasive because Batson 's step two requirements ensure the employee will 
receive enough information to carry her burden. IdL. at 257-58. In other words, because 
the employer is required to provide a reason for firing the employee that is facially 
neutral, legitimate, clear and reasonably specific, and particular to the case to be tried, the 
employee will receive the information necessary to prove, if true, the termination violated 
equal protection. IcL In the area of peremptory strikes, Batson's step two requirements 
become even more important. In employment discrimination cases, the employee is 
aided in carrying her burden by "the liberal discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in 
federal court," and "the [employee's] access to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint." Id. at 258. Whereas, in 
peremptory strike cases, the information available to the defendant to prove the State's 
peremptory strikes violated equal protection is largely the information the State itself 
provides under step two. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (holding step three requires 
"sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be 
available"); Colwell 2000 UT 8 at 1J20 (holding step three "generally turns on the 
credibility of the proponent of the strike" (citation omitted)). 
Second, requiring the State to provide a step two explanation that meets Batson 's 
step two requirements ensures the trial court will not be forced to undertake the step three 
analysis unnecessarily or with an incomplete record. Under step three, the trial court 
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must decide whether the State's explanation actually, not just facially, meets Batson's 
step two requirements. See Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at f l3 (citing Colwell 2000 UT 8 
at ^|22). To make this decision, the trial court looks beyond the face of the State's 
explanation and "undertake[s] 'a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available."' See idL (quoting Ratson, 476 U.S. at 93). If the 
State is not required to provide an explanation under step two that is, on its face, neutral, 
legitimate, clear and reasonably specific, and particular to the case to be tried, then the 
trial court will be forced to conduct the sensitive step three analysis with an incomplete 
understanding of the circumstances and direct evidence of intent necessary to make a 
ruling. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58 (noting step two creates factual basis for step 
three ruling because requires proponent of peremptory strike to provide "explanation of 
its legitimate reasons" that is "clear and reasonably specific"). 
Moreover, the sensitive step three analysis requires the trial court to conduct an in-
depth, factor-by-factor review of the circumstances surrounding the peremptory strike. 
See Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518-19. If the State's step two explanation need not facially meet 
Batson's step two requirements, then the trial court will almost always be forced to 
embark on step three's detailed analysis, even where the State's explanation is obviously 
discriminatory. For example, in People v. Blackwell, 665 N.E.2d 782 (111. 1996), the 
prosecutor struck female jurors because they were "proactive" or had been crime victims. 
Id at 787. The court easily disposed of this explanation in step two because the 
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prosecutor did not peremptorily strike any of the similarly-situated male jurors. Id. If 
Batson's step two requirements had not applied to step two's facial determination, then 
the trial court would have had to conduct a rigorous step three analysis, regardless of the 
discrimination inherent in the explanation. Id. 
In this case, the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a step two analysis. 
The court of appeals listed the criteria for determining step two as follows: 
The second step [of the analysis] requires "the prosecutor to 
come forward with a race-neutral explanation for the 
challenge." This step "does not demand an explanation that 
is persuasive, or even plausible." So long as the reasons 
given are "'(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) 
clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate,'" "'the 
reasons offered will be deemed race neutral.'" 
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^21 (quoting Cannon. 2002 UT App 18 at %9). This 
statement of Batson's step two requirements exactly follows the Supreme Court's 
instruction in Batson and Purkett. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20 (holding step two 
explanation must "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be 
tried," and "give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' 
for exercising the challenges" (citation omitted)); Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69 (holding 
step two "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible"). 
The State does not directly challenge the court of appeals' holding that Batson 's 
step two requirements apply to step two. Pet. Br. at 29-31. Instead, it argues the court of 
appeals erred by treating Batson's step two requirements as factors rather than simply as 
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"general descriptions of the type of explanation needed." Id^ at 31 (citations omitted). 
This argument contradicts the mandatory language used by the Supreme Court in Batson 
and by this Court when applying Batson, See Batson. 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20 (holding 
step two explanation "must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case 
to be tried," and "must give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 
'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges" (citation omitted)); Colwell, 2000 UT 
8 at TJ22 (holding "proponent's reason given to justify a peremptory challenge must be 
'"(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) 
legitimate."'" (citations omitted); Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 548 (same); Cantu, 778 
P.2d at 518-19 (same). 
Besides, whether Batson's step two requirements are factors or mere descriptions, 
the result is the same—if the explanation is not neutral, legitimate, clear and reasonably 
specific, and related to the case to be tried, then it does not satisfy step two and the trial 
court has no need to proceed to step three. See. University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n 
of Utah, 736 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Utah 1987) (applying Batson test to age discrimination 
case and holding step two satisfied because explanation raised "genuine issue of fact" 
and presented "legitimate reasons for not hiring appellant"). Contrary to the State's 
argument, this result does not transform step two's facial determination into step three's 
detailed analysis. See Pet. Br. at 31. Instead, it simply ensures that the State's 
explanation is detailed enough to allow the defendant to meet his burden and the trial 
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court to make an educated ruling. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58 (holding Batson 's 
step two requirements ensure employee will receive enough information to carry burden 
and creates factual basis for step three ruling); Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^[29-30 
(explaining failure to apply Batson's step two requirements to step two would allow State 
to "more easily" mask "sexist motives" by use of "unrelated but inherently 
nondiscriminatory explanations"). Thus, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' 
decision because it applied the correct criteria for determining step two. 
C. The Court of Appeals Correctly Concluded the State's Explanations Failed 
to Satisfy Step Two and Declined to Proceed to Step Three. 
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide "[w]hether the court of appeals 
applied the correct criteria for a Batson analysis." Order dated November 5, 2004. This 
narrow statement of the issue is appropriate because the State's petition for a writ of 
certiorari did not challenge the court of appeals' decision on the merits. See Cert. Pet. at 
13. As discussed above, the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a step two 
analysis. See Section III.B. Thus, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' 
recitation of the step two criteria and decline to review the court of appeals' application 
of these criteria to the facts of this case. See. Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) ("Only the 
questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the 
Supreme Court."); c£ State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (dismissing certiorari 
in case where State challenged court of appeals' Utah Constitution analysis but not 
federal constitution analysis because "evidence seized . . . must be suppressed regardless 
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of any decision we might render on the state constitutional issue1'). 
Regardless, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals correctly held 
the State's explanations did not satisfy the step two criteria. The court of appeals held 
the State's explanations were not clear and reasonably specific because they were 
demeanor-based, but did "not appear to have anything to do with the jurors themselves." 
See VaWez, 2004 UT App 214 at ffi|26-27. This holding is correct. The State said it 
struck Morely and Valerio because they "were 'overly compassionate'" and Gonzalez 
because she "was 'matter of fact.'" Id, at J^26; R. 209:79-80. These explanations were 
entirely demeanor-based and should have been supported by specific descriptions of 
behavior. See Brown, 973 F.2d at 121 (holding demeanor-based explanations require 
examples of "specific behavior" that render juror "unsuitable for service"); Blackwell, 
665 N.E.2d at 788 (holding "repeated use of vague, mistaken, and inconsistent 
explanations suggests that the State's reasons are pretextual" (citation omitted)). The 
State, however, provided no specific descriptions. R. 209:79-80. Although it mentioned 
Valerio's work at "a nonprofit," it admitted this was "not a basis upon which to strike 
her." IdL at 79. Similarly, although it cited Morely's work as a piano teacher and her 
subscriptions to the Reader's Digest, the Deseret News, and Sports Illustrated, it did not 
explain and the record does not reveal how these interests divulged undue compassion. 
Id. at 27, 79-80. Instead, the record shows Morely's discussion of herself was similar in 
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form and content to other jurors' discussions.3 Id. at 27. 
Further, as explained by the court of appeals: 
the prosecutor stated variously "I felt her responses lined up 
in a way that would make her not a helpful witness for the 
State . . . . Her responses to me seemed matter of fact and I 
felt like her responses would not make her a good juror for 
the State.. . . I don't recall what it was [about Ms. 
Thornton], there was something that I immediately decided 
that I would make her one of my strikes." 
Valdez 2004 UT App 214 at Tf26 (alteration in original); R. 209:79-80. The mere 
allegation of a reason, however, is not sufficiently clear and specific to justify a strike. 
See New Mexico v. Aragon, 784 P.2d 16, 21 (N.M. 1989) (holding State's explanation 
that it struck black jurors because they were related to another defendant was not clear or 
reasonably specific because not supported by record); BlackwelL 665 N.E.2d at 787 
(holding State's explanation that it struck female jurors because it "felt uncomfortable 
with them" was "vague"). Otherwise, parties could always rebut a Batson challenge by 
alluding to a legitimate reason. See United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (holding prosecutor's explanation that he struck juror because "I just got a 
feeling about him," "obviously [fell] short" of being clear and reasonably specific). 
Thus, the court of appeals correctly held the State's "vague and generic descriptions" of 
3
 Eight men and eleven women were employed, one man and three women 
enjoyed music, five men and eleven women subscribed to a newspaper, one man and two 
women subscribed to Sports Illustrated, and one man and two women enjoyed reading. 
R. 209:10-32. 
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the struck jurors were not clear or reasonably specific, as required by step two, and 
concluded these failures alone were sufficient to reverse. Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at 
TJ27; see J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 n.13 (holding "exclusion of even one juror for 
impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness 
of the system"). 
Although unnecessary to its decision, the court of appeals also noted that some of 
the State's explanations were "unrelated to the case at hand." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 
at ^28. As an example, the court of appeals cited the State's explanation that it struck 
"Thornton because she had been on a jury that had found a defendant, who had been 
charged with murder, guilty of manslaughter." Id. This explanation was irrelevant 
because Valdez was not charged with manslaughter or any other lesser-included offense. 
R. 2-4; 35-38. Thus, "Thornton's participation on a jury that convicted another 
defendant of manslaughter does not undermine her ability to be impartial in the present 
case." Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at 1J28. 
The court of appeals did not reach the adequacy of the State's remaining 
explanations, but these explanations also failed step two. See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 
at ^28-29. First, the State struck Morely in favor of a male juror who enjoyed hunting 
because he "would know about guns." R. 209:79-80. However, there was no evidence 
in the record to suggest Morely did not know about guns. Id. at 27; see State v. Jensen, 
2003 UT App 273,ffif2, 15, 76 P.3d 188 (holding State's explanation that it struck men 
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involved in protective orders because "assumed" they were the respondents was not 
gender-neutral because "motivation was unavoidably linked to the jurors' gender"); 
United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding State's explanation 
that it struck juror "because she lived in . . . poor and violent community whose residents 
are likely to be 'anesthetized to such violence'" was not race-neutral because "invocation 
of residence both reflected and conveyed deeply ingrained and pernicious stereotypes"). 
Although a simple question would have revealed Morely's gun knowledge, the State 
struck Morely without asking her any questions. R. 209:79-80; see. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 
143 ("If conducted properly, voir dire can inform litigants about potential jurors, making 
reliance upon stereotypical and pejorative notions about a particular gender . . . 
unnecessary and unwise."). Second, the State struck Gonzalez and Thornton because 
they "had heard of the case." R. 209:79. However, a third juror, Peggy Curtis, had also 
heard of the case and remembered it in far more detail than Gonzalez or Thornton. IcL at 
58, 61-62, 65-66, 79. Thus, the State's explanation that it struck Gonzalez and Thornton 
because they had heard of the case was suspect and required clarification. IJL 
Accordingly, the court of appeals correctly determined that the State's failure to provide 
explanations that satisfied criteria of step two warranted reversal in this case. 
D. Even If this Court Concludes the Court of Appeals Applied the Incorrect 
Criteria For a Step Two Analysis, It Should Still Affirm Because the Court of 
Appeals Would Have Reached the Same Conclusion Under Step Three. 
This Court's decisions have consistently applied Batson 's step two requirements 
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to the Batson analysis. See ColwelL 2000 UT 8 at Tf22 (holding "proponent's reason 
given to justify a peremptory challenge must be '"(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being 
tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.'"" (citations omitted); 
Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 548 (same); Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518-19 (same). Specifically, 
this Court's decisions have said a trial court, if it reaches step three, must review the 
circumstances of the case and decide whether the State's explanation was truly neutral, 
meaning it actually satisfied Batson's step two requirements. See Colwelh 2000 UT 8 at 
{^22 (affirming under step three because explanation satisfied Batson 's step two 
requirements); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 (same). Although this Court has not said 
whether Batson's step two requirements also apply step two, its decisions have suggested 
a trial court, under step two, should look at the State's explanation and decide whether it 
was facially neutral, meaning it appeared, on its face, to satisfy Batson's step two 
requirements. See Span. 819 P.2d at 343 (without distinguishing between steps two and 
three, noting prosecutor "articulated only a vague reason not related to the facts of the 
case for striking" juror, and concluding "[f]rom this it is difficult to determine whether or 
not the prosecutor's reason for striking [juror] was race-neutral"); Cantu, 778 P.2d at 
518-19 (without distinguishing between steps two and three, holding State's explanation 
that it struck Hispanic juror because it was angry at defense counsel who wanted 
Hispanic juror, violated equal protection because "neither neutral nor legitimate"); 
University of Utah, 736 P.2d at 634-35 (applying Batson test to age discrimination case 
38 
and holding step two satisfied because employer's explanation presented "legitimate 
reasons for not hiring appellant"). 
As discussed above, removing Batson's step two requirements from step two is 
contrary to Batson and Purkett. See Section III.B; Vajdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^[21. It 
also inhibits the defendant's ability to carry his burden to show the State's peremptory 
strike violated equal protection, and forces trial courts to conduct the step three analysis 
unnecessarily and without a complete record. See kL Regardless, if this Court concludes 
that Batson's step two requirements apply only to step three, then this Court should issue 
a decision clarifying what criteria go where in the Batson analysis, but affirming because 
the court of appeals would have reached the same decision under step three. 
If the State "tender[s] a neutral explanation" under step two, then the trial court 
must proceed to step three. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363 at f7 (citing Colwell 2000 UT 8 
at 1HJ17, 19). Under step three, the trial court must "look beyond" the face of the 
explanation and "determine whether the strike was purposefully discriminatory." Id. To 
make this determination, the trial court should examine the following factors: 
"(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in 
question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory 
examination assuming neither the trial court nor opposing 
counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for 
special questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4) 
the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, 
and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to 
jurors who were not challenged." 
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at ]fl3 (quoting Cantu_, 778 P.2d at 518-19) ("step three 
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factors"). "If, following this analysis, the trial court does not conclude that the reasons 
for the [State's] challenge are (1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and 
reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate, the trial court must disallow the peremptory 
challenge." Id (quoting ColwelL 2000 UT 8 at %L2). 
The trial court's step three decision "will not be set aside unless it is clearly 
erroneous." ColwelL 2000 UT 8 at ^[20. "To show clear error, the appellant must 
marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding and then demonstrate 
that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support the findings." Id. The marshaled evidence in this case is as follows: 
(1) Valerio worked for a nonprofit agency where she trained brain injured people 
for employment; had a high school education with some trade schooling classes; was 
married to a customer service representative; had two young children, subscribed to 
Sports Illustrated; and enjoyed camping, outdoor activities, and crafts. R. 209:14-16. 
The State struck Valerio because "her responses lined up in a way that would make her 
not a helpful witness for the State and that she would be somewhat overly 
compassionate." Id. at 79. The State also mentioned that Valerio worked for a nonprofit 
brain injury place, but concluded this was "not a basis upon which to strike her." Id_ 
(2) Gonzalez was a housekeeper in the process of retiring; had a high school 
education; was married to a retired man; had three grown children; subscribed to The 
Salt Lake Tribune and craft magazines; and enjoyed her cabin and grandchildren. R. 
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209:18-19. Gonzalez vaguely remembered hearing about the case, but could not 
remember where it happened and believed it would not bias her decision in the case. IcL 
at 65. The State struck Gonzalez because ?f[s]he had heard of the case . . . though she 
said that it wouldn't bother her," and "her responses to me seemed matter of fact and I 
felt like her responses would not make her a good juror for the State." IcL at 79-80. 
(3) Thornton did payroll/benefits for a family plumbing business; had attended 
two years of college; was married to the owner of the plumbing business; had three 
teenage children; subscribed to publications like Deseret News and Popular Science; and 
enjoyed reading and Irish folk dancing. R. 209:14. Thornton had served on a jury eight 
years prior where the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, but said this would not 
bias her decision in this case. IcL at 49-50. Thornton vaguely remembered hearing about 
Valdez's case, but said it would not bias her decision in this case. IcL at 58-59. The State 
struck Thornton because she had "heard of the case," "I don't recall what it was, there 
was something that I immediately decided that I would make her one of my strikes," and 
she had "been on a jury and he was found guilty of a manslaughter, which I thought was 
probably a one-step reduction, at least that's the assumption." IcL at 79. 
(4) Morely worked part-time for a school district helping children boost their 
reading and math levels; was a part-time piano teacher; had a bachelor's degree; was 
married to a Deseret Book store manager; had five teenage to early-twenties children, 
one of whom was deceased; subscribed to Readers Digest, Deseret News, and Sports 
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Illustrated; and enjoyed music, baking, outdoor activities with her family, camping, and 
going to football games. R. 209:27-28. The State struck Morely because another 
potential juror, a male, "was a hunter" and "would know things about guns." IcL at 79-
80. Although it could not clearly read its notes, the State believed Morely's "responses 
about position, her responses to little subtle things like her teaching piano lessons and the 
magazines she chose," revealed her as a person "that might be willing to let bygones be 
bygones, what I would say overly compassionate." IcL The State may have had other 
reasons for rejecting Morely, but it could not read its notes. IdL. 
(5) Curtis had heard of the case, could not remember all details, and believed her 
memory would not bias her decision. R. 209:61-62. Curtis served on the jury. R. 94. 
Based on this evidence, the trial court ruled: 
I'm satisfied with your explanation. I find . . . peremptory 
challenges [] Thornton, [] Valerio, [] Gonzalez, and [] Morely 
are gender neutral, they are related specifically to this case. 
They were clearly stated and Ihey are specific and legitimate. 
Therefore I am denying the challenge based on gender. I also 
note this is a jury of four men and four women. 
R. 209:80. 
Under step two, the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's ruling for an abuse 
of discretion. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^17. To reach its decision, the court of 
appeals looked at the State's explanation and "the general context of the case and the 
specific issues involved," and held the State's explanation did not satisfy step two 
because it did not satisfy Batson's step two requirements. Id at THJ17, 21 (citation 
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omitted); see Section III.C. Had the court of appeals proceeded to step three, it would 
have conducted the same analysis and reached the same conclusion. Valdez, 2004 UT 
App 214 at Tffl26-28. As under step two, it would have reviewed the State's explanation 
to determine whether the explanation satisfied Batson 's step two requirements. Id.; 
ColwelL 2000 UT 8 at |^22 (applying Batson's step two requirements to step three 
analysis). Then, as under step two, it would have concluded that striking female jurors 
because they were too compassionate and too matter-of-fact, without some gender-
independent reason for perceiving compassion or matter-of-factness, was not clear or 
reasonably specific. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at !Hf26-27; see. United States v. Tindle, 
860 F.2d 125, 129 (4 th Cir. 1988) (holding proper to strike juror because similar in size 
and appearance to defendant arguing mistaken identification because of size and 
appearance); United States v. Moreno, 878 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding proper 
to strike juror who had hostile attitude toward police); United States v. McCoy , 848 F.2d 
743, 745 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding proper to strike juror because young and unemployed 
like defendant); United States v. Briscoe. 896 F.2d 1476, 1488 (7 th Cir. 1990) (holding 
proper to strike juror because prior job as youth supervisor at penal facility would make 
sympathetic to defendant); United States v. Johnson, 905 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(holding proper to strike juror who worked with Division of Family Services because of 
possible sympathy for defendant); United States v. Ramirez-Soberanes, 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 6666 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (holding proper to strike 
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juror because fast-food workers "might have sympathies or prejudices for or against 
minorities") (Addendum E); State v. Williams, 545 So.2d 651, 655 (La. Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding proper to strike juror because gazed at defendant and mother sympathetically). 
The only difference would have been that the court of appeals' analysis under step 
three would have been much more fact-intensive because it would have been required to 
review each of the step three factors before reaching its conclusion. See Cantu, 778 P.2d 
at 518-19. Reviewing the step three factors would only have solidified the court of 
appeals' conclusion. First, the marshaled facts do not show Valerio, Morely, or 
Gonzalez shared the group bias alleged by the State. R. 209. The State accused Valerio 
and Morely of being overly compassionate and Gonzalez of being matter of fact, but the 
record does not reveal a non-gender basis for these complaints. See Section III.C. 
Similarly, the State struck Morely because she did not know about guns, but the record 
does not say whether Morely knew about guns. See id. Second, the State did not 
question the jurors it struck even though questioning could have revealed the biases it 
suspected. R. 209:14-15, 18, 27, 49, 65-66; see J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 143 ("If conducted 
properly, voir dire can inform litigants about potential jurors, making reliance upon 
stereotypical and pejorative notions about a particular gender . . . unnecessary and 
unwise."). Third, the State's reasons for striking Morely and Thornton were unrelated to 
Valdez's trial and would not have affected their ability to be effective jurors. See 
Section III.C. Fourth, the State struck the four women for reasons equally applicable to 
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other jurors not similarly challenged. See id. 
Besides, if this Court believes the court of appeals may have reached a different 
decision had it reached step three, then it should answer the question on certiorari 
review—whether the court of appeals applied the correct criteria for a Batson 
analysis—and remand to the court of appeals for application of the correct criteria to 
Valdez's case. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). By so doing, this Court will permit the 
court of appeals to analyze step three based on full-briefing of the issue. Both parties 
extensively briefed this issue in the court of appeals, including in-depth analyses of the 
step three factors and of whether the trial court provided sufficient findings and 
conclusions to allow appellate review. See Span, 819 P.2d at 343 (remanding because 
lack of findings by trial court made difficult to assess adequacy of State's explanation). 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ON APPEAL 
First, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review for determining 
step one. This Court has held step one is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 456. Following this Court's guidance, the court of appeals 
reviewed step one for abuse of discretion. Valdez., 2004 UT App 214 at Tfl5. In a 
footnote, the State suggests the court of appeals' use of an abuse of discretion standard in 
step one was "questionable" because "a prima facie showing is normally treated as a 
question of law." Pet. Br. at 34 n.5 (citing Bair v. Axiom Design. 2001 UT 20,Tfl3, 20 
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P.3d 388). This Court, however, has specifically held that it "is particularly appropriate" 
to review the prima facie showing of step one for an abuse of discretion. See Alvarez. 
872 P.2d at 456 n.3 (citation omitted). 
Second, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review to step two. 
This Court has not said what standard of review applies to step two. See ColwelL 2000 
UT 8 at 1ffll 1, 19; Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 548; Span, 819 P.2d at 338; Cantu, 778 
P.2d at 518; University of Utah, 736 P.2d at 634-35. It has, however, provided guidance 
as to how an appellate court should select a standard of review. See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). In Pena_, this Court employed "the metaphor of the judicial 
pasture." State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95^13. 103 P.3d 699. "The pasture is judicial 
discretion, and is bounded by fences which reduce or enlarge access to the available crop 
of discretion based on the nature of the matter which a judge is called upon to decide." 
Id. "For example, the fence line is long for pure questions of fact and narrow for 
questions of law corresponding to the 'clearly erroneous and correction-of-error 
standards,5 respectively." Id. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 937). "Mixed questions of law 
and fact comprise a third category which challenge those responsible for placing the 
fence lines along the spectrum of discretion." Id. The "'closeness of appellate review of 
the application of law to fact actually runs the entire length of this spectrum.'" Id. 
(quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 938). When deciding how much discretion to grant a trial 
court, appellate courts should grant trial courts more discretion: 
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(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are 
so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing 
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out; (ii) when 
the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is 
sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable 
to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be 
outcome determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge has 
observed 'facts,5 such as a witness's appearance and 
demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot 
be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate 
courts. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 (citation omitted). 
In this case, the court of appeals correctly reviewed step two for an abuse of 
discretion. As explained in section III.B, the step two analysis requires a trial court to 
"look to the face of the State's explanations" and determine whether they meet Batson 's 
step two requirements. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at [^17. To conduct this analysis, the 
trial court "does not weigh evidence" as it would a "factual issue," but must "consider[] 
the general context of the case and the specific issues involved." IcL_ Accordingly, the 
step two analysis is not a pure question of fact or a pure question of law. See Pena, 869 
P.2d at 937. Instead, it is a mixed question of fact and law and its standard of review 
falls somewhere between clear error and correctness on the spectrum. Id. at 938. Thus, 
the court of appeals correctly determined that "it is appropriate to consider this issue one 
of discretion with the trial court and to review the trial court's determination for abuse of 
that discretion." Valdez. 2004 UT App 214 at lfl7. 
In a footnote, the State suggests the court of appeals' use of an abuse of discretion 
47 
standard in step two was "questionable" because "whether an explanation is inherently 
discriminatory" is "a question of law." Pet. Br. at 34 n.5 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 
359, and Jensen, 2003 UT App 273 at TJ15). Jensen and Hernandez, however, do not 
review step two as a question of law. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359-60; Jensen, 2003 
UT App 273 at 1fl[15, 18. Instead, they hold "as a matter of law" that the peremptory 
strikes violated equal protection. Id.; see Black's Law Dictionary 1000 (8th Ed. 2004) 
(defining "matter of law" not as a standard of review, but as a "matter involving a judicial 
inquiry into the applicable law"). In fact, Jensen actually reviewed step two for clear 
error, giving the trial court more discretion than the court of appeals granted the trial 
court in this case. See Jensen, 2003 UT App 273 at 118. 
Third, the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review to step three. 
This Court and the Supreme Court have held step three is reviewed for clear error. See 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-69 (applying clearly erroneous standard to step three); 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at {^20 (same); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 (same); Cantu, 778 
P.2d at 518 (same). A clear error standard is warranted because step three "represents a 
finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal." Hernandez , 500 U.S. at 
364; see Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at |^20 (same). Although the court of appeals did not reach 
step three, it followed this Court's and the Supreme Court's guidance and held step three 
is a question of fact reviewed for clear error. See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at f 16. 
48 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision. If this Court reverses the 
court of appeals' decision, however, it should remand to the court of appeals for 
consideration of Valdez's arguments regarding the admissibility of BWS evidence. 
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214 at ^ 17 n.2; s_ee. Pet. Br. at 39. 
SUBMITTED this Id** day of June, 2005. 
"TTORI J. sEPpr""^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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instant case because the two jurors were not 
challenged by counsel.15 Similarly, Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) pro-
vides, with our emphasis, that "[n]o person 
may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless 
the judge is convinced the juror can and will 
act impartially and fairly." We disagree that 
the lack of a challenge obviates the problem 
in this case. Woolley and rule 18(e)(14) pre-
suppose that the trial court has fulfilled its 
duty to detect and investigate the potential 
for partiality so that counsel has the opportu-
nity to intelligently and effectively exercise 
challenges to jurors. Clearly, a juror cannot 
be challenged for cause until there is a basis 
for the challenge. The trial court's obli-
gation in this regard is essentially indepen-
dent of counsel's actions. "[T]rial judges 
[must] take care to adequately and complete-
ly probe jurors on all possible issues of bias," 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 
1991), so that the basis for challenges can be 
discovered.16 Only with that information on 
the table is counsel's duty to make appropri-
ate challenges triggered. 
1126 For the same reason, while the State 
is correct that Defendant neither attempted 
to have the jurors in question removed for 
cause, nor used a peremptory strike, the rule 
of State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 
1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 
910,130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995), "a case in which 
the Utah Supreme Court imposed a require-
ment for demonstrating prejudice in a relat-
ed context," Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 
152,1131, 71 P.3d 601, is inapplicable. Be-
cause the trial court did not fulfill its obli-
gation to fully probe the jurors about their 
potential prejudice, "the proceedings did not 
advance to the point at which, as in Menzies, 
a
 dispute arose over whether the trial court 
should have granted a challenge for cause." 
Id. at 132. 
15. Given our resolution of this case, it is unnec-
essary to address Defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
**• "The purpose for this probing is to facilitate 
both the detection of actual bias and the collec-
tion of data to permit informed exercise of the 
Peremptory challenge.' " Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 
UT App 152,112, 71 P.3d 601 (quoting State v. 
VALDEZ 
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CONCLUSION 
1127 When there is a specific reason to 
doubt a prospective juror's impartiality, 
sound discretion requires the trial court (or 
counsel, at the court's invitation) to question 
the juror so the court can meaningfully eval-
uate whether the juror will act impartially. 
Such did not occur in this case with respect 
to two jurors who served, and, accordingly, 
we reverse Defendant's conviction and re-
mand for a new trial.17 
1128 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and NORMAN 
H. JACKSON, Judge. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 24, 2004. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in 
the District Court, Third District, Salt 
Lake Department, Judith S. Atherton, J., 
of aggravated burglary, possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 
and criminal mischief. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, 
J.,: held that: 
(1) defendant's alleged failure to timely 
present Batson challenge did not pre-
Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983)), cert, 
denied, 11 P.3d 338 (Utah 2003). 
17. "In light of our decision to remand for a new 
trial, it is not necessary to discuss [Defendant's] 
other alleged errors." Id. at H 40 (internal quota-
tions and citation omitted). 
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vent district court from addressing 
challenge or result in waiver; 
(2) defendant's objections to state's use of 
peremptory challenges preserved Bat-
son claim for appeal, although he did 
not challenge validity of prosecutor's 
explanations; 
(3) Court of Appeals reviewed trial court's 
determination for abuse of discretion; 
and 
(4) prosecutor failed to articulate legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
using peremptory challenges to strike 
only women. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Jury <s>117 
Defendant's alleged failure to timely 
present Batson challenge by failing to raise it 
until after the venire had been dismissed, the 
jury had been sworn in, and the court prelim-
inarily instructed the jury did not prevent 
district court from addressing challenge or 
result in waiver; rather, court impliedly 
found good cause to allow challenge to state's 
peremptory strikes beyond usual limits by 
ignoring state's timeliness argument and re-
quiring the parties to proceed directly to 
arguments on the merits. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 14; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 18(c)(2). 
2. Jury <s=>117 
Under Batson, a challenge to a peremp-
tory strike must be timely. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 14. 
3. Criminal Law @=>1028 
Issues not raised in the trial court in 
timely fashion are deemed waived, preclud-
ing the appellate court from considering their 
merits on appeal. 
4. Criminal Law <S=*1035(5) 
What constitutes a timely challenge un-
der Batson depends entirely upon local pro-
cedures, but only firmly established and 
regularly followed state procedure may be 
interposed by a State to prevent subsequent 
appellate review of the important constitu-
tional claim. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
5. Jury <S>117 
A district court may consider a defen-
dant's Batson challenge beyond the dismissal 
of the venire, even if it has made no specific 
finding of good cause; so long as it allows 
counsel to proceed with their Batson argu-
ments, the district court impliedly finds good 
cause to consider the constitutional claim, 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; Rules Crim.Proc., 
Rule 18(c)(2). 
6. Criminal Law <S=>1035(5) 
Court of Appeals could not prevent ap-
pellate review of defendant's Batson claim 
due to lack of timeliness even if court agreed 
that Batson challenges were prohibited after 
the venire has been dismissed and the jury 
has been sworn, as proposed rule was not 
firmly established and regularly followed 
state procedure. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 18(c)(2). 
7. Criminal Law <3=>1035(5) 
Defendant's objections to state's use of 
peremptory challenges preserved Batsv^ 
claim for appeal, although he did not chal-
lenge the validity of the prosecutor's explana-
tions for the strikes. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
14. 
8. Criminal Law <3=>1030(1) 
To ensure the trial court's opportunity V) 
consider an issue, appellate review of crimi-
nal cases in Utah requires that a contempo-
raneous objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be madd 
a part of the trial court record. 
9. Criminal Law <3=>1043(1) 
In Utah, there is no clear rule requiring 
a defendant to renew a Batson objection or 
to object specifically to the state's offered 
explanations; rather, Utah courts do not re-
quire a party to continue to object once a 
motion has been made, and the trial court 
has rendered a decision on the issue, 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
10. Criminal Law <S=>1152(2) 
Court of Appeals considered defendant's 
Batson challenge one of discretion with the 
trial court and reviewed trial court's determi-
nation for abuse of that discretion; issue of 
whether the prosecutor offered a legitimate, 
STATE v. 
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nondiscriminatory reason for peremptory 
strikes was less like a factual issue, because 
the trial court did not weigh evidence, but 
instead looked to the face of the state's ex-
planations. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
11. Jury <^33(5.15) 
The first step of the tripartite process 
for determining whether the prosecution has 
engaged in prohibited discrimination in the 
jury selection process requires that a defen-
dant challenging the prosecutor's use of a 
peremptory challenge present a prima facie 
case of discrimination. 
12. Criminal Law «>1152(2) 
A trial court's determination that a de-
fendant has presented a prima facie case of 
discrimination in jury selection is a matter of 
some discretion on the part of the trial court, 
and will only be reversed if the trial court 
has abused its discretion. 
13. Criminal Law <S>1152(2) 
The Court of Appeals allows the trial 
court discretion in making the determination 
whether, in the context of the specific case, a 
defendant has presented a prima facie case 
of discrimination in jury selection. 
14. Jury e=>33(5.15) 
The third step of the tripartite process 
for determining whether the prosecution en-
gaged in prohibited discrimination during the 
jury selection process requires the trial court 
to weigh the evidence and look beyond the 
explanation, if possible, to determine whether 
the strike was purposefully discriminatory. 
15. Criminal Law <2>1158(3) 
The trial court's actions in weighing the 
evidence and looking beyond the explanation 
for a peremptory strike during jury selection 
to determine whether the strike was pur-
posefully discriminatory is intensely factual, 
and thus is reviewed for clear error. 
16. Jury e=>33(5.15) 
Pursuant to Batson, Utah courts apply a 
three-step test to determine whether the 
prosecutor has engaged in prohibited dis-
crimination during the jury selection process; 
this test equally applies in cases of gender 
discrimination. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
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17. Jury ^33(5.15) 
Under the second step of the three-step 
test to determine whether, pursuant to Bat-
son, the prosecutor has engaged in prohibit-
ed discrimination during the jury selection 
process, even suspect explanations must be 
deemed facially valid unless they are inher-
ently discriminatory. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 14. 
18. Jury <S=>33(5.15) 
Although the Batson challenge step re-
quiring the prosecutor to give an explanation 
following a prima facie case of discrimination 
does not demand an explanation that is per-
suasive, or even plausible, it does require the 
proponent of the peremptory challenge to 
come forward with a neutral explanation for 
the challenge. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14. 
19. Jury <S>33(5.15) 
Under Batson, the reason for a peremp-
tory strike must be related to the case being 
tried. U.S.CA. Const.Amend. 14. 
20. Jury ®=>33(5.15) 
Under Batson, the reason for a peremp-
tory strike must be clear and reasonably 
specific. U.S.CA. Const.Amend. 14. 
21. Jury ^33(5.15) 
Under Batson, a prosecutor is required 
to articulate a neutral explanation related to 
the particular case, giving a clear, concise 
and reasonably specific legitimate explana-
tion for excusing those jurors; there must 
also be support in the record for such an 
explanation. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14. 
22. Jury ®=>33(5.15) 
Prosecutor failed to articulate legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for using peremp-
tory challenges to strike only women; state 
did not provide any basis for explanations 
that some jurors were "overly compassion-
ate" or "matter of fact," state cited vague 
nondiscriminatory motives without tying mo-
tives to jurors themselves, and some of 
state's explanations were unrelated to case at 
hand. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14. 
23. Jury <S>33(5.15) 
In order to survive a Batson challenge, 
it is not enough for the prosecutor simply to 
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describe a nondiscriminatory motive without 
tying it to something specific about the juror 
herself. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
24. Jury <3=>33(5.15) 
If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a 
reason for striking a juror, courts consider-
ing a Batson challenge should apply particu-
larly careful scrutiny, because such after-the-
fact rationalizations are susceptible to abuse. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
25. Juiy <s=>33(5.15) 
Unless the neutral explanation offered 
by the state for a peremptory strike may, on 
its face, be tied to the issues, evidence, and 
context of the case at hand, the explanation 
will not be considered legitimate; rather, the 
court reviewing a Batson challenge will con-
sider the explanation mere pretext as a mat-
ter of law, unrelated as it is to the reality of 
the proceedings before the district court. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
John D. O'Connell Jr. and Lori Seppi, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Chris-
tine Soltis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, P.J., GREENWOOD 
and JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
111 Anthony James Valdez appeals convic-
tions for aggravated burglary, a first-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-6-203 (2002); possession of a dan-
gerous weapon by a restricted person, a sec-
ond-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated section 76-10-503(2)(a) (2002); 
and criminal mischief, a class B misdemean-
or, in violation of Utah Code Annotated sec-
tion 76-6-106 (2002)." We reverse and re-
mand. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 Valdez was prosecuted for various do-
mestic violence charges, including the violent 
crimes listed above. On October 29, 2002, 
the district court conducted voir dire to se-
lect a jury for Valdez's trial. Following the 
jury selection, Valdez objected to the State's 
use of its peremptory challenges under Bcfe 
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct 1712, 
90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In order to demon-
strate a prima facie case of discrimination 
under Batson, Valdez's counsel noted that 
the State used all four of its peremptory 
challenges to exclude women from the jury. 
Valdez further noted that in a domestic vio< 
lence jury trial, gender issues tend to be 
highly charged. Ultimately, he argued, the 
State's exclusion of only women from the 
jury cannot be disregarded, on its face, in the 
context of this case. 
H 3 The State did not argue that Valdez 
had failed to present a prima facie case of 
discrimination, but instead argued Valdez's 
Batson challenge was untimely. Without ad-
dressing the timeliness of Valdez's challenge* 
the district court, ordered the State to explain 
its challenges. The State explained its chal-
lenges as follows: 
[T]he State chose to strike Ms. Valerio 
because she stated that she worked for a 
nonprofit brain injury type of place. That 
is not a basis upon which to strike her [for 
cause], but I felt her responses lined up in 
a way that would make her not a helpful 
[juror] for the State and that she would be 
somewhat overly compassionate. 
The second [juror] was Ms. Gonzalez, 
She had heard of the case and seemed— 
though she said that it wouldn't bother 
her, her responses to me seemed matter of 
fact and I felt like her responses would not 
make her a good juror for the State. 
Ms. Thornton had also heard of the case 
and I don't recall what it was, there was 
something that I immediately decided thaf 
I would make her one of my strikes 
She'd also been on a jury and he was found 
guilty of a manslaughter, which I thought" 
was probably a one-step reduction, at least 
that's the assumption. So again, I felt like 
she was not going to be a helpful one foe 
the State. 
The last one I agonized over whether>t» 
strike, No. 19, Paul[a] Morely or 21 RoS 
Hardy, I conferred with my colleague, ..& 
STATE v. 
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and we talked about it and she brought to 
my attention he was a hunter and that she 
felt like a hunter would know things about 
guns and brought that point about that 
potential juror and another one. And after 
conferring with her I changed my mind 
and went with [herl—and that was sim-
ply—she was simply towards the end. I 
suppose there was also it felt like she was 
not strong, not—I'm sorry, Fm trying to 
read my notes here 
There was this pattern of—her respons-
es made me think she would be somebody, 
again, that might be willing to let bygones 
be bygones, what I would say overly com-
passionate, and it was just based on her 
responses about position, her responses to 
little subtle things like her teaching piano 
lessons and the magazines she chose. We 
don't have a lot to base these things on, so 
that's how I made those choices. 
(First alteration in original.) Ultimately, the 
district court accepted the State's explana-
tions and overruled Valdez's objection. 
114 During the jury trial, the victim recant-
ed her accusation against Valdez. The State 
called an expert in Battered Women Syn-
drom (BWS) to explain why many victims of 
abuse recant their accusation against their 
abuser. Valdez objected to the testimony, 
but the district court overruled the objection. 
The jury found Valdez guilty of aggravated 
burglary, possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person, and criminal mischief. 
Valdez appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
115 Valdez challenges the district court's 
ruling that the State offered nondiscriminato-
ry reasons for its use of peremptory strikes. 
I. Procedural Issues 
116 As a preliminary matter, the State 
raises two threshold procedural issues that, 
according to the State, bar appellate review 
of Valdez's challenges. 
A. Timeliness 
[1-4] 117 First, the State contends Valdez 
did not raise his Batson challenge in a timely 
manner. Under Batson, a challenge to a 
VALDEZ Utah 295 
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peremptory strike must be timely. See Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99-100, 106 
S.Ct. 1712, 1724-25, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) 
(allowing for local timeliness rules to bar 
Batson challenges); Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah CtApp. 
1989) (stating, in context of Batson challenge, 
"[i]t is axiomatic that, before a party may 
advance an issue on appeal, the record must 
clearly show that it was timely presented to 
the trial court in a manner sufficient to ob-
tain a ruling thereon"). "Issues not raised in 
the trial court in timely fashion are deemed 
waived, precluding this court from consider-
ing their merits on appeal." Carlston, 776 
P.2d at 655. What constitutes a timely chal-
lenge under Batson depends entirely upon 
local procedures, see id.; Ford v. Georgia, 
498 U.S. 411, 423, 111 S.Ct. 850, 857, 112 
L.Ed.2d 935 (1991), but only " 'firmly estab-
lished and regularly followed state [proce-
dure]' may be interposed by a State to pre-
vent subsequent [appellate] review" of this 
important constitutional claim. Id. at 423-
24, 111 S.Ct. at 857 (citation omitted). 
118 Valdez waited to raise his Batson chal-
lenge until after the venire had been dis-
missed, the jury had been sworn in, and the 
court preliminarily instructed the jury. The 
State refers us to several other jurisdictions 
that require a Batson challenge to be raised 
no later than "in the period between the 
selection of the jurors and the administration 
of their oaths." Id. at 422, 111 S.Ct. at 857; 
see also Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655-56 (citing 
favorably, in dicta, several jurisdictions that 
require Batson challenge to be raised prior 
to dismissing venire). The reason for bar-
ring a Batson challenge after the jury is 
sworn in has been variously stated as follows: 
The "timely objection" rule is designed to 
prevent defendants from "sandbagging" 
the prosecution by waiting until trial has 
concluded unsatisfactorily before insisting 
on an explanation for jury strikes that by 
then the prosecutor may largely have for-
gotten. Furthermore, prosecutorial mis-
conduct is easily remedied prior to com-
mencement of trial simply by seating the 
wrongfully struck venireperson. After tri-
al, the only remedy is setting aside the 
conviction. 
296 Utah 95 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
Id. at 656 (citations omitted); see also People 
v. Holder, 153 IlLApp.3d 884, 106 Ill.Dec. 
700, 506 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1987) (stating waiv-
er rule enforced "so as not to allow a defen-
dant to object to that which he has ac-
quiesced in" throughout trial). 
119 Furthermore, the State argues, this 
rule is consistent with Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 18(c)(2), which provides "[a] chal-
lenge to an individual juror may be made 
only before the jury is sworn . . . except the 
court may, for good cause, permit it to be 
made after the juror is sworn but before any 
of the evidence is presented." In State v. 
Harrison, the Utah Supreme Court applied 
rule 18's good cause provision to review an 
untimely Batson challenge. See 805 P.2d 
769, 776 (Utah 1991). However, in that case 
the challenge was "made and argued immedi-
ately after the jury was sworn in, before the 
challenged jurors were excused from service, 
and before opening statements of counsel." 
Id. This is significant, the State maintains, 
because once the venire and the challenged 
jurors have been dismissed, the remedy of 
reinstating the wrongly challenged juror is 
no longer available. Thus, under the State's 
argument, Harrison represents the "outside 
limit" in Utah to timely raising a Batson 
challenge. 
[5] 1110 However, under Harrison, a dis-
trict court may consider a defendant's Bat-
son challenge beyond the dismissal of the 
venire, even if it has made no specific finding 
of good cause pursuant to rule 18 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 805 P.2d 
at 776. So long as it "allowfs] counsel to 
proceed with their [Batson ] arguments," the 
district court impliedly finds good cause un-
der rule 18 to consider the constitutional 
claim. Id. In this case, the district court did 
just that by ignoring the State's timeliness 
argument and requiring the parties to pro-
ceed directly to arguments on the merits. 
Thus, the district court impliedly found good 
cause under rule 18 to allow a challenge to 
the State's peremptory strikes beyond the 
usual limits. 
1. This issue would best be addressed by an 
amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. This opinion should not be read as a 
[6] Ull However, even if we adopted the 
State's position, we could not "interpose[ ]" it 
"to prevent subsequent [appellate] review" in 
this case. Ford, 498 U.S. at 424, 111 S.Ct at 
857. The rule the State proposes, which 
would prohibit Batson challenges after the 
venire has been dismissed and the jury has 
been sworn, has not heretofore been a 
" 'firmly established and regularly followed 
state [procedure].' " Id at 423, 111 S.Ct. at 
857 (1991) (citations omitted). At best, this 
rule could be gleaned by analogy and impli-
cation from Hanison and rule 18. However, 
rule 18 itself allows Batson challenges at a 
later time than the State's proposed rule, 
because it allows challenges "before any of 
the evidence is presented." Utah R.Crim. P. 
18(c)(2). Thus, in the absence of any firmer 
and more established authority on the sub-
ject, we could not prevent appellate review of 
Valdez's constitutional claim due to lack of 
timeliness.1 
B. Preservation 
[7,8] 1112 Second, the State argues Val-
dez failed to preserve his objection to the 
State's explanation for the strikes. Specifi-
cally, Valdez did not challenge the validity of 
the prosecutor's explanations for the strikes. 
Consequently, the State argues, Valdez is 
precluded from attacking the State's explana-
tions for the first time on appeal. "[T]0 
ensure the trial court's opportunity to consid-
er an issue, appellate review of criminal cases 
in Utah requires 'that a contemporaneous 
objection or some form of specific preserva-
tion of claims of error must be made a part 
of the trial court record.' " State v. Brown, 
856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)). 
[9] 1113 We are persuaded by Valdez, 
however, that his initial objection to the 
State's use of peremptory challenges to 
strike women from the jury constituted suffi-
cient preservation of his constitutional claim 
Ford v. Georgia held that an appellate court 
cannot prevent review by applying a "rule 
unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial." 
comment, positive or negative, on the appropri-" 
ateness of the rule the State proposes. 
STATE v. 
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498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 858, 112 
L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). In Utah, there is no 
clear rule requiring a defendant to renew a 
Batson objection or to object specifically to 
the State's offered explanations. Rather, 
Utah courts do "not require a party to con-
tinue to object once a motion has been made, 
and the trial court has rendered a decision on 
the issue." State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 
4,1114, 20 P.3d 265. Here, Valdez objected to 
the State's use of peremptory challenges, 
thereby preventing any claim that he strate-
gically hid his objection until after obtaining 
an unsatisfactory result, which seems to be 
the State's strongest objection to Valdez's 
challenge. 
II. Issue and Standard of Review 
[10] 1i 14 Valdez specifically challenges 
the district court's ruling that the State of-
fered a nondiscriminatory reason for its use 
of peremptory strikes. We are unaware of 
any cases properly applying an appropriate 
standard of review for such challenges. 
State v. Chatwin appears to set forth a 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review for 
such challenges. See 2002 UT App 363,115, 
58 P.3d 867. "Chatwin argues that the pros-
ecution's stated reason for striking the po-
tential juror was not neutral and constituted 
illegal discrimination Absent a showing 
of clear error, we will not overturn a trial 
court's determination concerning the dis-
criminatory intent embodied in a party's ex-
planation for the exercise of a peremptory 
challenge." Id. To establish the clearly erro-
neous standard of review in the step two 
context, however, Chatwin cited, without 
analysis, State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,-
?5, 41 P.3d 1153. That case set forth the 
clearly erroneous standard of review in the 
step three context, and is inapplicable here. 
Chatwin went further, however, and decided 
the step two question as a matter of law, 
rather than applying the clearly erroneous 
standard it previously set forth. Here, our 
decision will analyze and clarify the appro-
priate standard of review for step two chal-
lenges. Accordingly, we must determine the 
aPpropriate standard of review, relying on 
analogy to other standards of review applica-
ble in cases involving alleged discrimination 
HI the voir dire process. 
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[11-13] 1115 The challenge at issue in-
volves the second step of a tripartite process 
for determining whether the prosecution has 
engaged in prohibited discrimination in the 
jury selection process. See Chatwin, 2002 
UT App 363 at 11 7, 58 P.3d 867. The first 
step of that test requires that a defendant 
challenging the prosecutor's use of a peremp-
tory challenge must present a prima facie 
case of discrimination. See id A trial 
court's determination that a defendant has 
presented a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion is a matter of some discretion on the 
part of the trial court, and we will only 
reverse that determination where the trial 
court has abused its discretion. See State v. 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994). The 
purpose for allowing the trial court some 
discretion in determining whether the defen-
dant has presented a prima facie case of 
discrimination was stated by the Utah Su-
preme Court as follows: 
The abuse of discretion standard of review 
is particularly appropriate to this ques-
tion [T]he United States Supreme 
Court was reluctant to define in detail 
what facts will raise an inference of dis-
crimination. Likewise, we have not articu-
lated specific factors that amount to a 
"strong likelihood" that minority jurors 
were challenged because of their racial or 
ethnic group membership. By according 
discretion to the trial court in this area, we 
permit "experience to accumulate at the 
lowrest court level" until we "see more 
clearly what factors are important to [the] 
decision and how to take them into ac-
count." 
See id. at 456 n. 3 (citations omitted). What 
may constitute a prima facie showing of dis-
crimination in the context of one case may 
not constitute a showing of discrimination in 
the context of another case. This is so be-
cause each case may turn on different issues, 
or even subtly different nuances. Thus, we 
allow the trial court discretion in making the 
determination whether, in the context of the 
specific case, a defendant has presented a 
prima facie case of discrimination. 
[14,15] 1116 The third step of the tripar-
tite process for determining whether the 
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prosecution engaged in prohibited discrimi-
nation during the jury selection process re-
quires the trial court to weigh the evidence 
and "look beyond the explanation, if possible, 
to determine whether the strike was pur-
posefully discriminatory." Chatwin, 2002 
UT App 363 at 117, 58 P.3d 867. More than 
being dependant on the particular issues, 
circumstances and nuances of a particular 
case, this determination requires the trial 
court to delve into a weighing of the evidence 
and the credibility of the prosecutor. See 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 
111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). 
This is an intensely factual determination, see 
State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,1113, 41 
P.3d 1153, and we thus review the trial 
court's factual findings for clear error. See 
State v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 273,117, 76 
P.3d 188. 
1117 In our view, the issue involved here, 
whether the prosecutor offered a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory 
strikes, is closely analogous to the step one 
issue. It seems less like a factual issue 
because the trial court does not weigh evi-
dence, but instead looks to the face of the 
State's explanations. See Chatwin, 2002 UT 
App 363 at H 7, 58 P.3d 867 (stating prosecu-
tor's explanation "must be, at the very least, 
facially neutral" (emphasis added)). The tri-
al court's examination of the facial neutrality 
of the State's explanation also considers the 
general context of the case and the specific 
issues involved, see id. (stating prosecutor's 
explanation "must be . . . related to the case 
being tried"), similar to the way the trial 
court considers whether the defendant has 
presented a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. See Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455-56. In-
deed, the district court's consideration of the 
context of the case is an indispensable por-
tion of the step two analytic framework, as 
we will discuss below. Thus, steps one and 
two in the analytical process appear to be 
analytic reciprocals. Accordingly, it is ap-
propriate to consider this issue one of discre-
tion with the trial court and to review the 
2. Because Valdez's step two challenge consti-
tutes a sufficient basis to reverse, we do not 
reach his alternate step three argument. Fur-
ther, we do not reach Valdez's arguments re-
garding the admissibility of Battered Woman 
trial court's determination for abuse of that 
discretion.2 
III. Batson and its Progeny 
1118 Valdez claims the State engaged ifc 
impermissible gender discrimination during 
the selection of the jury. In Batson v. Ken-
tucky, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution governs the use of peremptory 
challenges by prosecutors in criminal trials: 
See 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 
69 (1986). In Batson, the United States 
Supreme Court stated that although a defen-
dant has "no right to a 'petit jury composed 
in whole or in part of persons of his own 
race,' " id. at 85, 106 S.Ct. at 1717 (citation 
omitted), a "defendant does have the right'to 
be tried by a jury whose members are select-
ed pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria/! 
Id. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. at 1717. In J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 
L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the United States Su^  
preme Court extended the holding of Batsm 
to protect litigants from gender discrimina-
tion in the jury selection process: "We haye 
recognized that . . . litigants . . . have an 
equal protection right to jury selection proce-
dures that are free from state-sponsored 
group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, 
historical prejudice We hold that gender, 
like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for> 
juror competence and impartiality." 7d,at 
128-29,114 S.Ct. at 1421. 
The litigants are harmed by the risk that 
the prejudice that motivated the discrimi-
natory selection of the jury will infect thfc 
entire proceedings 
When state actors exercise peremptory 
challenges in reliance on gender stereo-
types, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial 
views of the relative abilities of men alia 
women. Because these stereotypes have 
wreaked injustice in so many other 
spheres of our country's public life, activfe 
discrimination by litigants on the basis d 
gender during jury selection "invites cyni-* 
Syndrome evidence within the context of this 
case. See State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 919 
(Utah 1998) (holding where one argument 
dispositive of the appeal, we need not address the 
defendant's remaining arguments). 
STATE v. 
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cism respecting the jury's neutrality and 
its obligation to adhere to the law." The 
potential for cynicism is particularly acute 
in cases where gender-related issues are 
prominent, such as cases involving rape, 
sexual harassment, or paternity. Discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges may 
create the impression that the judicial sys-
tem has acquiesced in suppressing full par-
ticipation by one gender or that the "deck 
has been stacked" in favor of one side. 
Id. at 140, 114 S.Ct. at 1427 (citations omit-
ted). 
[16] 1119 Pursuant to Batson, Utah 
courts apply a three-step test to determine 
whether the prosecutor has engaged in pro-
hibited discrimination during the jury selec-
tion process. See State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 
517, 518 (Utah 1989) (applying three-step 
test to question of racial discrimination). 
This test equally applies in cases of gender 
discrimination. See State v. Jensen, 2003 UT 
App 273,1113, 76 P.3d 188 (applying three-
step test to question of gender discrimina-
tion). We have stated the test as follows: 
"[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory 
challenge has made out a prima facie case 
of [gender] discrimination (step 1), the bur-
den of production shifts to the proponent 
of the strike to come forward with a [gen-
der]-neutral explanation (step 2). If a 
[gender]-neutral explanation is tendered, 
the trial court must then decide (step 3) 
whether the opponent of the strike has 
proved purposeful [gender] discrimina-
tion." 
Id. at 1113 (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 
8,1117, 994 P.2d 177 (other citation omitted)) 
(alterations in original). 
H 20 In the State's brief, it concedes that it 
waived the issue of whether Valdez present-
ed a prima facie case of discrimination. See 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at 1118, 994 P.2d 177 
(stating prosecution must challenge sufficien-
cy of prima facie case before providing rebut-
tal explanation for strike, or issue is waived). 
Thus, we examine only step two of the analy-
sis. 
[17,18] 1121 Under this step, even "sus-
pect" explanations must be deemed "facially 
valid" unless they are "inherently discrimina-
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tory." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,-
1110, 41 P.3d 1153; see also Hernandez v. 
New York 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 
1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ("Unless a dis-
criminatory intent is inherent in the prosecu-
tor's explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed [gender] neutral"). Although this 
step "does not demand an explanation that is 
persuasive, or even plausible," Purkett v. 
Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 
1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), it does "re-
quire[ ] the proponent of the peremptory 
challenge, the prosecutor in this case, to 
come forward with a [gender]-neutral expla-
nation for the challenge." Colwell 2000 UT 
8 at 1117, 994 P.2d 177. Utah courts have 
enumerated a number of factors that must be • 
considered within the context of the case at 
hand to determine whether the prosecution 
has offered a legitimate explanation: 
The second step [of the analysis] requires 
"the prosecutor to come forward with a 
race-neutral explanation for the challenge." 
This step "does not demand an explanation 
that is persuasive, or even plausible." So 
long as the reasons given are " '(1) neutral, 
(2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear 
and reasonably specific, and (4) legiti-
mate,' " " 'the reason[s] offered will be 
deemed race neutral.'" 
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at 119, 41 P.3d 1153 
(citations omitted). 
1122 The courts have been instructive in 
defining and applying each of these factors. 
For example, in Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., the 
Tenth Circuit was asked to decide whether a 
defendant's explanation for a peremptory 
strike was facially neutral. See 206 F.3d 
1013, 1018 (10th Cir.2000). In that case, the 
defendant struck a Hispanic woman from the 
venire, explaining that it was because of her 
youth. See id. The court, looking specifical-
ly at the facial validity of the defendant's 
explanation, concluded the strike was neu-
tral, holding: "A neutral explanation means 
an explanation based on something besides 
the race of the juror Unless discrimina-
tory intent is inherent in the justification, the 
reason offered will be deemed race neutral." 
Id. at 1019. Such a rationale is similarly 
applied to show gender neutrality. 
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1123 The "legitimate" factor is closely re-
lated to the "neutral" factor. As this court 
has noted, the Supreme Court has provided 
guidance in determining whether the reason 
for a peremptory strike is legitimate: " *a 
"legitimate reason" is not a reason that 
makes sense, but a reason that does not deny 
equal protection; " State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 
401, 404 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citation omit-
ted). For example, in Merrill the defendant 
claimed that the reason the prosecutor gave 
for his peremptory challenge was not legiti-
mate. See id. The prosecutor had dis-
missed a potential juror who was Asian. See 
id. at 402. The reason for the dismissal, the 
prosecutor explained, was because he feared 
the potential juror would be biased against 
law enforcement due to a recent speeding 
ticket. See id. We concluded that was a 
legitimate explanation because it "does not 
deny a potential juror equal protection." Id. 
at 404. 
[19] 1124 The reason for a peremptory 
strike must also be related to the case being 
tried. In State v. Cantu, a prosecutor's rea-
son for a peremptory strike of a Hispanic 
potential juror was invalidated in part be-
cause it was unrelated to the juror or the 
case. See 778 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989). 
The prosecutor's proffered reason for the 
strike was because he was angry with de-
fense counsel. See id. The Utah Supreme 
Court held that this explanation was desulto-
ry, and thus insufficient to fulfill the Batson 
requirement that peremptory strikes must be 
based upon grounds reasonably related to 
the case at bar. See id. 
[20,21] H25 Finally, the reason for a 
peremptory strike must be clear and reason-
ably specific. This factor prevents a prose-
cutor from merely denying the existence of a 
discriminatory motive or by generally pro-
claiming good faith, ensuring that equal pro-
tection will not become a "vain and illusory 
requirement." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 
(1986). Rather, it requires the prosecutor 
"to articulate a neutral explanation related to 
the particular case, giving a clear, concise 
and reasonably specific legitimate explana-
tion for excusing those jurors." New Mexico 
v. Aragon, 109 N.M. 197, 784 P.2d 16, 21 
(1989). There must also be support in the 
record for such an explanation. See State v. 
Macial 854 P.2d 543, 547 (Utah Ct.Appl 
1993). For example, in Aragon, the prosecu-
tor struck two prospective jurors who were 
black because they were possibly related to 
the defendant. See 784 P.2d at 17. The 
New Mexico Supreme Court noted that noth-
ing in the record showed the prosecutor had 
any basis for his opinion that the potential 
jurors might be untrustworthy, other than 
his own statement of their possible bloocj 
relationship. See id. As a result, the court 
ruled that "[t]he prosecutor's explanation 
was hardly 'a clear, concise, and reasonably 
specific explanation for excusing those ju-
rors.' " Id. at 21 (citation omitted). Accord-
ingly, the court reversed the trial court. See 
id. 
IV. Valdez's Batson Challenge 
[22,23] H 26 With that analytical frame-
work in mind, we approach Valdez's step two 
challenge. Valdez's argument that the 
State's peremptory challenges violated equal 
protection is persuasive. Specifically, Valdez 
argues that the State's reason for using per-
emptory challenges to strike only women was 
not reasonably clear or specific. As in Ano-
go% there is little in the record to demon-
strate that the State had any basis for its 
strikes of these four women. For example, 
as Valdez aptly notes, the State explains that 
Jurors Morely and Valerio were "overly com-
passionate" and Gonzalez was "matter of 
fact" without providing any clear basis for its 
opinions other than these cursory descrip-
tions. Further, the prosecutor stated vaii? 
ously "I felt her responses lined up in a way 
that would make her not a helpful witness for 
the S ta te— [H]er responses to me seemed 
matter of fact and I felt like her responses 
would not make her a good juror for the 
S ta t e— I don't recall what it was [about 
Ms. Thornton], there was something that 
immediately decided that I would make hca 
one of my strikes." These explanations afl 
fall short of being reasonably clear and sp# 
cific. It is not enough for the prosecutoi 
simply to describe a nondiscriminatory mo* 
tive without tying it to something specific 
about the juror herself. See United States it 
STATE v. 
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Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1989) 
(holding prosecutor's explanation that he 
struck juror because "I just got a feeling 
about him" "obviously [fell] short" of being 
reasonably clear and specific). 
[24] 1127 If the prosecutor cites demean-
or as a reason for striking a juror, courts 
should apply "particularly careful scrutiny" 
because "such after-the-fact rationalizations 
are susceptible to abuse." Brown, v. Kelly, 
973 F.2d 116, 121 (2nd Cir.1992). Although 
not required, prosecutors "would be well ad-
vised to make contemporaneous notes as 
to the specific behavior on the prospective 
juror's part that renders such person unsui-
table for service on a particular case." Id. In 
this case, however, the State was hardly 
clear, concise, or reasonably specific in its 
explanations. It offered nothing more than 
vague and generic descriptions of the jurors 
that anyone would concede are nondiscrimi-
natory, but which do not appear to have 
anything to do with the jurors themselves. 
This is not sufficient to satisfy our equal 
protection jurisprudence, and is sufficient in 
itself to reverse the trial court's treatment of 
the State's peremptory strike. 
1128 In addition to not being reasonably 
clear and specific, some of the State's expla-
nations were unrelated to the case at hand. 
For example, the State struck Thornton be-
cause she had been on a jury that had found 
a defendant, who had been charged with 
murder, guilty of manslaughter. As Valdez 
correctly notes, other than being a criminal 
offense, manslaughter has nothing to do with 
the present case. Valdez was not charged 
with manslaughter or any other lesser-in-
cluded offenses. Furthermore, Thornton's 
participation on a jury that convicted another 
defendant of manslaughter does not under-
mine her ability to be impartial in the pres-
ent case. 
[25] U29 The State argues in its brief 
that these explanations were not inherently 
discriminatory because nothing in the expla 
nations themselves pointed directly to the 
sorts of invidious stereotypes the law con-
demns. While this may be true, the test for 
determining the legitimacy and facial nni 
trality of an explanation in the Batson con-
text is the list of factors outlined in Cannon, 
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see 2002 UT App 18,119, 41 P.3d 1153, and 
analyzed above. Unless the neutral explana-
tion offered by the State may, on its face, be 
tied to the issues, evidence, and context of 
the case at hand, the explanation will not be 
considered legitimate. Rather, we will con-
sider the explanation mere pretext as a mat-
ter of law, unrelated as it is to the reality of 
the proceedings before the district court. 
1130 Were we to hold otherwise, we would 
sanction the use of fanciful and spurious ex-
planations for even the most sinister discrim-
inatory motives. Without the requirement 
that the explanation at least have, on its face, 
a grounding in the context of the case itself, 
racist or sexist motives could more easily be 
masked by unrelated but inherently nondis-
criminatory explanations. In such a case, 
the district court would have no need to 
proceed to step three to plumb the depths of 
the prosecutor's motivations because the 
State had offered nothing concrete by way of 
explanation. See State v. Chativin, 2002 UT 
App 363,1! 20, 58 P.3d 867 (holding State did 
not offer legitimate step two explanation, ob-
viating the need to proceed to step three). 
This is just such a case. The prosecutor's 
explanations had no clear and specific basis 
in the case at hand. Thus, we hold it was an 
abuse of the district court's discretion to 
determine the explanations were nondiscrim-
inatory and to proceed to step three. 
CONCLUSION 
11 31 The State's peremptory strikes should 
have been invalidated by the trial court be-
cause the State failed to offer facially legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory explanations. The 
explanations were neither clear and specific 
nor related to the case being tried. Accord-
ingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 
1132 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and PAMELA 
T. GREENWOOD, Judge. 
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ADDENDUM B 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
1 Representative Power to reduce appoint-
ment,] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3 [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
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The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
provisions of this article. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the jury and notify the 
parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial. The following 
procedures for selection are not exclusive. 
(a)(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the number of the 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for 
any alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges 
for cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in 
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during 
the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the 
request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for 
cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a 
list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, 
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular 
turn, as the court may direct, until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or 
waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as 
shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and 
the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate 
jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of jurors that are 
to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any 
alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for 
cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in 
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during 
the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the 
request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the 
prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a 
time in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. 
The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors 
have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order 
by computer, the clerk mav call the iurors in that random order. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examina-
tion of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit 
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary 
statement of the case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to 
make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of 
trial. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror 
(c)(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for 
the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to 
all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(c)(l)(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, draw-
ing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(c)(l)(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn 
and shall be in writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set forth 
the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge. 
(c)(l)(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is 
based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as 
witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel 
is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is 
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors 
to proceed. 
(c)(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is 
sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be 
made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In 
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings 
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the 
prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the 
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised 
separately or jointly. 
(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be 
heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person 
may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for 
cause may be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion 
the court may remove a juror upon the same grounds. 
(e)(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(e)(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(e)(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, nr on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(e)(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relation-
ship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to 
have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when 
viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective 
juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because the juror 
is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof; 
(e)(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by the defendant 
in a criminal prosecution; 
(e)(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(e)(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(e)(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to trjr the same charge, and 
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after 
the case was submitted to it; 
(e)(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the 
defendant for the act charged as an offense; 
(e)(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to 
impose the death penalty following conviction or would require the juror to 
impose the death penalty following conviction regardless of the facts; 
(e)(ll) because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged 
or interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying 
on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(e)(12) because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the 
defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(e)(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(e)(14) conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that rea-
sonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No 
person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the 
juror can and will act impartially and fairly. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who, prior to 
the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified 
to perform their duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have one 
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. Alter-
nate jurors shall be selected at the same time and in the same manner, shall 
have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and 
challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, 
powers, and privileges as principal jurors. Except in bifurcated proceedings, an 
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged when 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. The identity of the alternate jurors may 
be withheld until the jurors begin deliberations. 
(h) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence 
and the instructions of the court. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
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copies of the convictions, the sentences in those cases, the 
judgments. Okay. Did I represent that accurately? 
MR, O'CONNELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else before we 
break? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor, I 
noticed that when we were doing the jury selection that the 
State struck all women, and that's a basis for a Batson 
challenge. 
THE COURT: Not a Batson. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Whatever the follow-up case is that 
extended Batson, the gender, and I think at this point all I 
need to do is establish that there was a pattern. And I think 
the fact that the State used all of their peremptories on 
women -- I don't know if there's any better evidence to show 
that there is a pattern of -- based on gender. I don't think 
we had any minorities at all, even Ms. Gonzalez didn't appear 
to be Hispanic, so I don't think I'd have any based on race, 
but on the fact that the State moved every single one of the 
peremptories were based on --
THE COURT: Mr. Burmester? 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I think defense counsel's 
objection is untimely. We've seated this jury, sworn this 
jury, the proper Batson challenge must be made prior to that 
point. 
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THE COURT: Well, not withstanding that, can you give 
me a basis to rebut Batson type challenge? 
MR. BURMESTER: Yes, Your Honor With regard to the 
State's number one, the State chose to strike Ms. Valerio 
because she stated that she worked for a nonprofit brain injury 
type of place. That is not a basis upon which to strike her, 
but I felt her responses lined up in a way that would make her 
not a helpful witness for the State and that she would be 
somewhat overly compassionate. 
The second witness was Ms. Gonzalez. She had heard 
of the case and seemed -- though she said that it wouldn't 
bother her, her responses to me seemed matter of fact and 1 
felt like her responses would not make her a good juror-for the 
State. 
Ms. Thornton had also heard of the case and I don't 
recall what it was, there was something that I immediately 
decided that I would make her one of my strikes. She'd also 
been on a jury and he was found guilty of a manslaughter, which 
I thought was probably a one-step reduction, at least that's 
he assumption. So again "I ieli like she was not going to be 
i helpful one for the State. 
The last one I agonized over whether to strike, 
Jo. 19, Paul Morely or 21 Ron Hardy, I conferred with my 
n
* j colleague, Ms. -- and we talked about it and she brought to n , 
attention he was a hunter and that she felt like a hunter would 
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know things about guns and brought that point about that 
potential juror and another one. And after conferring with her 
I changed my mind and went with Ms -- and that was simply --
she was towards the end. I suppose there was also it felt like 
she was not strong, not -- I'm sorry, I'mi trying to read my 
notes here. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. BURMESTER: There was this pattern of -- her 
responses made me think she would be somebody, again, that 
might be willing to let bygones be bygones, what I would say 
overly compassionate, and it was just based on her responses 
about position, her responses to little subtle things like her 
teaching piano lessons and the magazines she chose. We don't 
have a lot to base these things on, so that's how I made those 
choices. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And I'm satisfied 
with your explanation. I find with regard to peremptory 
challenges No. 6, Tamara Thornton, No. 7 Linda Valerio, 
No. 10, Joyce Gonzalez, and No. 19, Paula Morely are gender 
neutral, they are related specifically to this case. They were 
clearly stated and they are specific and legitimate. Therefore 
I am denying the challenge based on gender. I also note this 
is a jury of four men and four women. 
MR. BURMESTER: ^es, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Be back in about 
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1. Defendant Did Not Establish a Prima Facie Case of Purposeful 
Discrimination. 
After each party exercised its four peremptory challenges and the jury was sworn, 
defendant's counsel raised a Batson objection to the prosecutors fourth peremptory 
challenge against Juror 11, Amador Romero. R. 101: 25-26/ Counsel pointed out that Juror 
11 was the only minority of the sixteen prospective jurors from which the jury would be 
selected. R. 101:26. He further argued that because Juror 11 was a minority, he would ha\e 
"more sympathy" for his client who came "from a lower socioeconomic environment." R. 
101: 26. The prosecutor argued that he was not required to provide an explanation for the 
strike, contending that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. 
R. 101: 26-27. Relying solely on the fact that "Romero" is a Hispanic surname, the trial 
court found that Juror 11 was a minority. R. 101: 27. The court ruled that "given that fact 
alone, Counsel's probably entitled to some explanation as to [the prosecutor's] reasons so 
[the court] may then determine whether or no t . . . it was neutral and not racially charged . 
. . ." R. 101: 27. The trial court's conclusion was error. 
In the first instance, the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding 
that Juror 11 was in fact a minority. As observed by this Court in Bowman, "L'tah courts 
have never found a Spanish surname alone sufficient to show minority status unless that 
minority status was corroborated by the trial court or the jurors themselves, or wa* 
undisputed." 945 P.2d at 156. The record does not support a finding that Juror 11 was a 
:The portion of the transcript containing defendant's Batson objection and the trial 
court's ruling thereon is reproduced in Addendum A. 
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In support of the allegations of Count II, the trial court received certified copies of 
judgments of defendant's prior convictions for attempted forgery and attempted unlawful 
distribution of a controlled substance, both third degree felonies (R. 124:108-10, State Ex. 
7,8). 
Defendant's challenge to prosecution strike of potential juror 
The jury panel consisted of twenty-one persons (Jury List, R. 76-77, attached at 
Addendum B). As an aid in the jury selection process, the trial court gave each member of 
the jury panel a short written questionaire. The questionaire asked about each potential 
juror's work, marital status, education, membership in club and organizations, news source, 
i.e., newpapers, radio, or television, and magazine subscriptions (R. 124:2). The trial court 
specifically requested that each potential juror "speak loud and clear," to assist the attorneys 
in hearing (R. 124:2).4 
Matsy Sili, (venireman #3) was the third prospective juror to respond to the court's 
questions (R. 124:4). He spoke some words, which were recorded as "inaudible" (R. 124:4). 
The trial court said: "Sorry, sir. I can't - - you'll have to speak louder or a little clearer. I 
can't understand you" (R. 124:4). Mr. Sili then stated: "I'm Matsy Sili. [inaudible]. My wife 
is Mariana. She works for UPS. Just high school, no clubs or [inaudible], USA Today 
Newpaper." The court then inquired, "Do you take any magazines?" (R. 124:4). Mr. Sili 
answered, "No." The court then further inquired, "What does your wife do for - - is it UPS? 
4
 The entire jury voir dire is attached at Addendum C. 
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Mr. Sili answered, "She works in the [inaudible]. The court again asked, ''[inaudible] 
Center?" Mr. Sili, answered, "Yeah,1'which concluded responses (R. 124:4-5). Thereafter, 
the court elicited answers concerning the questionnaire from the rest of the panel and asked 
a variety of standard questions designed expose any bias or impartiality (R. 124:5-29). 
After the trial court had completed the jury voir dire, prospective jurors #2 and #13 
were removed for cause and prospective juror #15 was removed by stipulation of the parties 
(R. 76, 124:29). Counsel for defendant and the State then exercised their peremptory 
challenges (R. 76). The prosecutor used his second peremptory strike to remove Mr. Sili 
from the jury panel (R. 76). Out of the presence of the jury, defendant asserted that the 
prosecutor had removed the only minority person on the panel and asked for an explanation 
(R. 124:37). When the trial court asked for the prosecutor's reasons, the prosecutor noted 
that the court must first rule on whether defendant had made a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination before requiring the prosecution to respond (R. 124:37-38). The court 
nevertheless insisted on the prosecutor's explanation (R. 124:38). 
The prosecutor explained his race neutral reasons as follows: 
MR. NIELSEN [Prosecutor]: Thank you. Your Honor, our [inaudible] 
explanation is just to note for the Court that No. 3 is not of the same racial 
group as the defendant, that based on his answers to the court's voir dire 
questions that he didn't appear to fully understand as well as some of the other 
jurors and he had difficulty explaining himself, that he is one of the more 
undereducated people on the jurors [sic]. I believe it's important for our case 
for the jurors to understand what's going on, understand the law. There's 
going to be some complicated issues [inaudible] to be decided. I believe that 
that would interfere with deliberations and him trying to explain himself or 
understand the legal issues involved. 
8 
(R. 124:38). 
Defense counsel disagreed, arguing that the limited voir dire did not provide sufficient 
basis to distinguish Mr. Sili from other jurors in the particulars identified by the prosecutor 
and that there was nothing to indicate that he would have problems understanding the 
proceedings (R. 124:38). 
The trial court stated: "The Court would just note in the course - - I'm sure both 
counsel noted it - - that the Court on the voir dire that he did not speak clear and the Court 
did not understand him. Til just make that comment as far as the race is concerned. Bring 
the jury in." At that point, without further discussion, the trial began (R. 124:39). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant has failed to show that the prosecutor's challenge to a jury panel member 
belonging to a racial minority was purposeful discrimination. The prosecutor struck the 
prospective juror, who had only a high school education, because the prosecutor wanted to 
impanel a reasonably well-educated jury and because the prospective juror had difficulty 
making himself understood. These reasons are race-neutral. The trial court also found that 
the prosecutor's explanation for the strike was not a pretext for discrimination, particularly 
because the court itself found the prospective juror difficult to understand. 
POINT II 
Defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of purchase, 
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OPINION: 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 
* This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court 
generally disfavors the citation of orders and 
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment 
may be cited under the terms and conditions of 
10th Cir.R. 36.3. 
Luis Alberto Ramirez-Soberanes appeals his 
conviction |*2] for possession of a firearm by an illegal 
alien, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), contending 
that his constitutional rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 90 L Ed. 2d 69, 106 S Ct. 1712 (1986), were 
violated by the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge 
to remove an African-American from the jury panel. 
Specifically, he argues that the district court erred in 
crediting the government's proffered race-neutral 
explanation for the peremptory challenge. Ramirez-
Soberanes also asserts that the district court erred in 
instructing the jury on constructive possession of a firearm, 
and that the prosecutor's comments during closing 
argument constituted a constructive amendment of the 
indictment and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof 
to the defense. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
On September 25, 1997, law enforcement officials 
executed a search warrant on a Park City, Utah, 
condominium, based on information that a suspect named 
Carlos was selling cocaine out of the unit. After entering 
the condominium, officers ordered the nine Hispanic males 
present, including the defendant, to lie face down on [*3] 
the floor while officers performed a protective sweep of 
the premises. Officers then asked the men if any firearms 
were in the apartment. Deputy Sheriff Brad Wilde testified 
that defendant responded, "I have a gun, and it's in the 
closet." R. Vol. VII at 90. In the closet, police found a .45 
caliber semi-automatic handgun, a loaded magazine, and a 
box of .45 caliber ammunition. The defendant was taken to 
the sheriffs office, where, after waiving his Miranda rights, 
he admitted that he was a Mexican citizen, that he was 
present in the United States illegally, and that he had 
purchased the .45 caliber handgun from a pawn shop 
approximately six months before. 
On October 2, 1997, a federal grand jury indicted 
defendant for possession of a firearm by an illegal alien, 
and possession of ammunition by an illegal alien, both in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). 
At jury selection, defendant objected to the 
prosecution's peremptory strike of Ms. Hannah Brown, an 
African-American woman. Upon the objection, the district 
court judge and counsel retired to the judge's chambers, 
where the prosecutor, Mark Vincent, explained his 
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justification for removing Ms. Brown: [*4] 
MR. VINCENT: The reason is her place of 
employment; has nothing to do with her 
ethnic background. 
THE COURT: Where does she work? 
MR. VINCENT: She works at McDonald's. 
THE COURT: The reason-she works at 
McDonald's and you find that significant is 
what? 
objected to proposed Instruction No. 19, arguing that it 
inadequately defined constructive possession, and 
suggested that the court instead adopt the definition 
contained in United States v. Mills, which stated that "[a] 
person has constructive possession when he or she 
knowingly holds ownership, dominion, or control over the 
object and the premises where it is found." 29 F.3d 545, 
549 (10th Cir. 1994). After reviewing Mills, the court [*6] 
agreed that it set forth the proper definition of constructive 
possession, and made several attempts at rephrasing the 
instruction to conform to the Mills language. Due to some 
apparent confusion about how the instruction would read, 
the court then stated: 
MR. VINCENT: Nothing more than they 
have a tendency in fast-food restaurants to 
deal with-in lot of areas minority groups, 
legals, illegals. There may be some 
sympathies that are there one way or the 
other. And just to eliminate any sense of 
prejudice one way or the other, we felt that 
it was appropriate to strike her. 
R. Vol. VII at 49. In restating his grounds for the 
peremptory challenge, Mr. Vincent explained: 
Well, I'm not prejudiced against her for 
being black. . . . If she was white, if she 
was Hispanic, if she was any other 
ethnicity, it is my experience that people 
who work at McDonald's have a lot of 
dealings with a large group of people, 
including aliens. And I don't know if there's 
any sympathies one way or the other, but 
because there is a propensity for her to have 
dealings with a large group of people, that 
may or may not have prejudiced her. I don't 
know. I just feel that it's [*5] sufficient. 
Id. at 50. To support his assertion that he had not removed 
Ms. Brown because of her race, Mr. Vincent emphasized 
that he had not used peremptory challenges to remove two 
Hispanic jurors from the venire. 
After listening to Mr. Vincent's explanation, the 
district court accepted his proffered reason, stating: "Mr. 
Vincent has given an answer that I think satisfies Batson. 
He says that in his experience people who work at 
McDonald's might have some personal experiences that 
might, and I think he said, either way affect their ability to 
be impartial." Id. Ms. Brown was excused from the jury. 
At the conclusion of trial, the district court discussed 
the proposed jury instructions with counsel. Defendant 
I'll tell you what. Let me have [the clerk] 
type it up, and then I will go over 
[instruction number] 19 with you again at 
our next break. . . . I'll make a copy of the 
19 for you so that we make sure that we're 
all on the same track, and we'll go over it 
one more time before instructing the jury, 
okay? 
R. Vol. VII at 151. After the change was made, the court 
read the amended instruction to both counsel. Though the 
amended instruction omitted some of the Mills language, 
defendant's counsel accepted the instruction without 
objection. Copies of the final instructions were given to 
both counsel, and neither party objected to any of the 
instructions when they were subsequently presented to the 
jury. 
In his closing argument, Mr. Vincent reviewed the 
evidence, arguing that the government had proven each 
element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. With 
respect to defendant's possession of the gun, he told [*7] 
the jury that "to possess means to have something within 
your control," R. Vol. VII at 179, and suggested that the 
defendant first possessed the gun when he purchased it on 
March 15, 1997. He then stated: "We have not heard any 
evidence that that firearm was ever sold, was ever given, 
was ever transferred to any other individual in this case." 
Id. Upon objection by defense counsel, the court 
admonished the jury that "the burden is always on the 
government to prove its case. The defendant does not have 
to do anything. The defendant does not have to contest 
evidence." Id. 
Mr. Vincent continued with his argument that 
defendant had possessed the gun both when he purchased 
it on March 15, and at the time of the search, on September 
25. He stated to the jury that "either of those dates works" 
because the indictment charged that "on or about 
September 25,1997," defendant had possessed the firearm, 
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and that "within reason, and within six months, that is 
reasonable." Id. at 184. 
Defendant did not object to this argument, though he 
vigorously contested it in his own closing argument, telling 
the jury that the indictment's charge could not be stretched 
to cover defendant's possession [*8] at the time of the 
March 15 purchase. He argued that if the government had 
wanted to prove the March 15 possession, it should have 
charged the offense as a March 15 possession. Defendant 
argued that the government had failed to prove that he had 
possessed either the gun or the ammunition on September 
25, 1997. 
In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor focused 
entirely on the September 25 search, arguing that 
defendant's own statements made during the search 
demonstrated that he held control and dominion over the 
gun at that time. He then stated that "ownership, although 
isn't conclusive of possession, it goes a long ways to say 
that you have possession of something, you have dominion 
and control." R. Vol. VII at 195. 
The jury found defendant guilty of possession of a 
firearm by an illegal alien, but acquitted him of the 
possession of ammunition charge. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Peremptory Challenge 
Defendant first argues that the district court erred in 
allowing the prosecutor to remove Ms. Brown from the 
jury panel. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 
2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), the Supreme Court held that 
the Constitution prohibits a prosecutor from [*9] using a 
peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror on account 
of her race. Under the three-step procedure set forth in 
Batson, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing 
of purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the 
jury. See id. at 96. "Once the defendant makes a prima 
facie showing, the burden shifts to the [prosecution] to 
come forward with a neutral explanation" for the 
peremptory challenge. Id. at 97. If the court concludes that 
the prosecution's articulated reason is race neutral, it must 
then determine whether the defendant has carried his 
burden of proving purposeful discrimination. See id. The 
question of whether a proffered explanation is race neutral 
is a matter of law we review de novo, see United States v. 
Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994), while the 
ultimate question of whether intentional discrimination 
occurred is a question of fact we review under the clearly 
erroneous standard, see United States v. Davis, 40 F.Sd 
1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994). 
Defendant focuses on step two nl of the Batson 
analysis, arguing that the prosecutor's articulated reason for 
[*10] striking Ms. Brown was not race neutral. A neutral 
explanation is one "based on something other than the race 
of the juror," n2 and "unless a discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered 
will be deemed race neutral." Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d395, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
The proffered reason need not be "persuasive, or even 
plausible," so long as it is facially valid. Purkett v. Elem, 
514 U.S. 765, 768, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 115 S Ct. 1769 
(1995). 
nl While the district court made no 
preliminary finding that defendant had made a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, this 
preliminary issue becomes moot once the 
prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation 
for peremptory challenges, and the district court 
has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional 
discrimination. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 
US. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 1859 
(1991). 
n2 The dissent defines a race neutral reason as 
"a reason other than race," relying on part of a 
sentence from Hernandez. 500 US. at 371. 
However, both the plurality and concurring 
opinions in Hernandez make clear that the focus of 
the Batson analysis is the race of the juror. See id. 
at 359 ("A neutral explanation in the context of our 
analysis here means an explanation based on 
something other than the race of the juror.") 
(Kennedy, J., plurality) (emphasis added); id. at 
373 ("Consistent with our established equal 
protection jurisprudence, a peremptory strike will 
constitute a Batson violation only if the prosecutor 
struck a juror because of the juror's race.") 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
[Ml] 
Here, the prosecutor asserted that he struck Ms. Brown 
from the venire because she worked at McDonald's, and 
that, in his experience, persons who work in fast-food 
restaurants might have sympathies or prejudices for or 
against minorities or aliens. Defendant does not seriously 
contest the government's assertion that it also would have 
struck a white McDonald's employee, an assertion 
supported by the district court's finding. Essentially, 
defendant argues that under Batson, no juror can be struck 
for suspected bias favorable to co-workers or customers 
with whom the juror is in close daily contact, if the co-
workers or customers are members of a minority group. We 
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are not persuaded that Batson and Hernandez go that far. 
Federal courts have consistently upheld peremptory 
challenges based upon the employment of the juror. See 
United States v. Alvarado, 951 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(allowing peremptory strike because juror was a social 
worker); United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 
1989) (current and past employment are legitimate race-
neutral grounds for peremptory strikes); United States v. 
Johnson, 905 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1990) [*12] (allowing 
peremptory strike where juror worked for state family 
services agency); United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102 
(10th Cir. 1991) (allowing peremptory challenge where 
juror worked as Legal Aid secretary). Each of these 
explanations is race neutral because it is "based on 
something other than the race of the juror." Hernandez, 
500 U.S. at 360. n3 
n3 In the two cases defendant cites on this 
issue, the prosecutors' articulated reasons for 
exercising peremptory challenges were based, at 
least in part, upon the race of the juror. See United 
States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 
1989); Thompson v. Florida, 548 So. 2d 198, 202 
(Fla. 1989). Hence, because the reason given in the 
present case was based on the juror's employment, 
the cited cases are inapposite to our analysis. We 
recognize that the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. 
Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992), found the 
government's strike of a black juror because she 
lived in a high-crime neighborhood to be an 
impermissible surrogate for racial bias. However, 
that case and similar state cases are distinguishable 
from this case on their facts and, in any event, do 
not control our decision. 
[*13] 
When reviewing peremptory challenges, "we must 
keep firmly in mind that Batson's holding rests squarely on 
the Equal Protection Clause." United States v. Uwaezhoke, 
995F.2d388, 393 (3d Cir. 1992). In the context of Bat son, 
the Equal Protection Clause does not protect an individual 
from being removed from a jury because of the particular 
viewpoints she is suspected of holding; it only prohibits the 
removal of a juror for viewpoints attributed to the juror 
because of her race. Where a prosecutor alleges that an 
individual may have acquired sympathies or prejudices 
through her employment, n4 and not simply because she 
shares the race of the defendant, the prosecutor has 
articulated a race-neutral explanation. n5 
n4 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the 
holding in this case does not extend beyond the 
place of employment, as the text makes clear. 
n5 Indeed, the defense in this case could have 
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a 
McDonald's worker from the jury pool, on the 
theory that his or her workplace associations may 
have produced an anti-minority bias. 
1*14] 
Of course, the trial court is not obligated to believe the 
reason given by the prosecution. If it concludes that the 
juror was actually struck because of his or her race, it may 
reject the government's proffered reason as pretextual. 
However, the question of whether a prosecutor's 
explanation is merely a pretext for racial bias should be 
addressed in step three of the Batson analysis, see Purkett, 
514 U.S. at 768; at the second stage "the issue is the facial 
validity of the prosecutor's explanation." Hernandez, 500 
U.S. at 360. In the present case, after the prosecutor 
articulated his race-neutral reason for striking Ms. Brown, 
and after defendant offered his counter argument, the 
district court accepted the prosecutor's explanation. 
Because this decision rests primarily on credibility 
determinations, we give great deference to the district 
court's findings. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. In 
reviewing the record, we find no clear error. 
In sum, we hold that, as a matter of law, the prosecutor 
offered a race-neutral explanation for his peremptory strike 
of Ms. Brown, and that the district court did not err in its 
ultimate conclusion [*15] that the defendant failed to 
prove purposeful racial discrimination. 
II. Jury Instructions 
The indictment charged that 
on or about September 25, 1997, in the 
Central Division of the District of Utah, 
Luis Alberto Ramirez-Soberanes, the 
defendant herein, then being an alien 
illegally and unlawfully in the United States 
of America, did knowingly possess in and 
affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . 
in violation of Title 18, United States Code 
§ 922(g)(5). 
Indictment at 1-2, R. Vol. I, Doc. 10. In a § 922(g) case, 
the government may prove possession that is either actual 
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or constructive. See United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 
1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1989). On this requirement, the 
district court instructed the jury as follows: "If you find 
that the defendant either had actual possession or had 
ownership, dominion, or control over the firearm, even 
though it may have been in the physical possession of 
another, you may find that the government has proved 
possession." Instruction No. 19, R. Vol. I, Doc. 91. 
Defendant contends that, under Mills, constructive 
possession occurs only when a person "knowingly holds 
[*16] ownership, dominion, or control over the object and 
the premises where it is found," 29 FJdat 549 (emphasis 
added), and that the district court erred by omitting the 
words "and the premises where it is found" from the 
instruction. 
Because defendant did not object to the instruction 
given, we review for plain error only. See United States v. 
Fabiano, 169 F 3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999). However, 
we note that the standard of review does not control our 
decision, as we conclude that, under any standard, the 
omission of the words "and the premises where it is found" 
was not erroneous. 
In United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 87 9 (10th Cir. 
1987), we reaffirmed a twenty-year-old holding that a 
person has constructive possession of an item when he 
"knowingly holds the power and ability to exercise 
dominion and control over it." Id. at 881 (citing United 
States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. link, 612F.2d511, 516 (10th Cir. 1980); 
Amaya v. United States, 373 F2d 197, 199 (10th Cir. 
1967)). We restated the "dominion and control over [*17] 
the item" rule in United States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293, 
1296 (10th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by 
United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1996), 
and added that, in some instances, "exercising dominion 
and control over a residence where contraband is concealed 
may constitute constructive possession of the narcotics." 
Id. 
After Parrish, a panel of this circuit stated that 
"generally, a person has constructive possession of 
narcotics if he knowingly has ownership, dominion or 
control over the narcotics and the premises where the 
narcotics are found." United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 
883, 888 (10th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added), abrogated on 
other grounds by Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 
133 L. Ed. 2d 472, 116 S Ct. 501 (1995). For this 
proposition, the Hager panel cited only Parrish. However, 
in suggesting a two-part test that lists in the conjunctive the 
requirements that a person have ownership, dominion or 
control over the contraband and over the premises where it 
is found, Hager departed from both Parrish and the 
constructive possession standards [*18] of other circuits 
that use similar language but list the factors in the 
disjunctive. n6 
n6 See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 
106, 107 (4th Cir. 1992) (constructive possession 
when evidence shows "ownership, dominion, or 
control over the contraband itself or the premises or 
vehicle in which the contraband is concealed") 
(emphasis added); United States v. McKnight, 953 
F.2d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 1992) (constructive 
possession when evidence shows "ownership, 
dominion, or control over the contraband itself or 
over the premises in which the contraband is 
located") (emphasis added); United States v. 
Wainwright, 921 F2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(constructive possession over contraband when 
evidence shows "ownership, dominion or control 
over the contraband itself, or dominion over the 
premises in which the contraband is concealed") 
(emphasis added). 
Since Hager, many of our cases (including the Mills 
case cited by defendant) have [*19J repeated this general 
statement, although none of them have been decided based 
on a conjunctive requirements of dominion over an item 
and the premises. However, in other recent cases, we have 
cited the Culpepper definition, finding constructive 
possession where the defendant has the power to exercise 
control and dominion over the item alone. See, e.g., United 
States v. Sullivan, 919 F2d 1403, 1430 (10th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 
1996). In any event, Culpepper is the law in this circuit; 
therefore, constructive possession exists where the 
defendant has the power to exercise control or dominion 
over the item. See 834 F.2d at 881. Control or dominion 
over the premises where the item is found is therefore a 
factor, see Parrish, 925 F.2d at 1296, but not a 
requirement, for finding constructive possession of the 
item itself. Accordingly, the district court's omission of the 
words "and the premises where it is found," whether 
intentional or accidental, was not error. 
Defendant also complains that, under the instruction 
given, mere ownership of the gun would be sufficient [*20] 
to constitute constructive possession. However, defendant 
did not make this specific objection in any of the 
discussions of the jury instructions. Accordingly, we will 
not reverse unless the district court committed plain error. 
See Fabiano, 169 F.3d at 1302. Such an error must be 
obvious and affect the defendant's substantial rights. See 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 123 L. Ed. 2d 
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508, 113 S Ct. 1770 (1993). We see no obvious error in 
the district court's instruction, and furthermore, see nothing 
that "'seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038 
(1985) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 
160, 80 L. Ed. 555, 56 S. Ct. 391 (1936)). Accordingly, we 
find no plain error. 
III. Constructive Amendment 
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor's 
statements in closing argument, where he told the jury that 
possession on either March 15 or September 25 was 
sufficient for conviction, constructively amended the 
indictment and allowed the jury to convict him for 
possessing the [*21] gun on a date not charged in the 
indictment. We disagree. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Fifth 
Amendment does not "permit a defendant to be tried on 
charges that are not made in the indictment." Stir one v. 
United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 4L. Ed. 2d 252, 80S. Ct. 
270 (1960). A constructive amendment occurs when the 
evidence presented, together with the jury instructions, 
raises a substantial likelihood that the defendant was 
convicted of an offense other than that charged in the 
indictment, United States v. Hornung, 848F. 2d1040,1046 
(10th Cir. 1998), and requires reversal per se. 
Even if we assume that the March 15 possession was 
a different offense than the "on or about September 25" 
possession charged in the indictment, we conclude that 
there is no substantial likelihood that the jury convicted 
defendant for his March 15 purchase. The court's 
instructions to the jury properly limited the charges on 
which defendant could be convicted to those occurring "on 
or about September 25." Instruction No. 17, R. Vol. I, Doc. 
91. In its opening charge, the court instructed the jury that 
"the statements, the arguments, the objections by the [*22] 
attorneys are not evidence" and that they "must not 
consider them." R. Vol. VII at 53. In its final instructions, 
the court instructed the jury that if any difference appears 
between the law as stated by counsel and that stated by the 
court in its instructions, the instructions govern. See 
Instruction No. 1, R. Vol. I, Doc. 91. We must presume 
that the jurors remained loyal to their oaths and 
conscientiously followed the district court's instructions. 
See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9, 85 L. Ed. 
2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985). Furthermore, the 
prosecutor's rebuttal argument focused entirely on the 
evidence of defendant's September 25 constructive 
possession. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor's stray 
comments during closing argument did not constructively 
amend the indictment. Cf. United States v. Williams, 106 
F.3d 1173, 1176 (4th Cir. 1997) (no impermissible 
amendment when indictment alleged distribution of 
methamphetamine and prosecutor's closing argument 
indicated that admission to distribution of marijuana 
proved guilt, because jury instructed that closing argument 
not evidence); United States v. Russo, 708F2d209, 212-
14 (6th Cir. 1983) [*23] (no impermissible amendment of 
indictment charging extortion by threats of economic loss 
when evidence introduced at trial demonstrated extortion 
by threats or fear of violence because jury instructions 
clearly limited charge to extortion by threat of economic 
loss). 
IV. Burden Shifting 
Defendant's final contention is that the prosecutor's 
comments in closing argument impermissibly shifted the 
burden of proof to the defense. In reviewing the 
prosecutor's remarks, we think they are more properly 
characterized as an attempt to summarize the evidence and 
comment on its probative value. However, even assuming 
arguendo that the prosecutor's comments implied a burden 
shift, the district court immediately gave a curative 
instruction that was accurate and straightforward. The 
prosecutor's closing arguments did not deprive defendant 
of a fair trial. See United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 
595-96 (10th Cir. 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment 
of the district court. 
ENTERED FOR THE COURT 
Stephen H. Anderson 
Circuit Judge 
CONCURBY: LUCERO (In Part) 
DISSENTBY: LUCERO (In Part) 
DISSENT: LUCERO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part 
[*24] and dissenting in part. 
I concur in the majority opinion except as to the 
Batson claim. As to that issue, because the prosecution's 
proffered reason for its peremptory challenge is expressly 
race-based, I dissent. Batson and its progeny clearly 
disallow the result reached today. 
"[A] race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge 
means a reason other than race." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 
371. In the present case, the prosecution proffered an 
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explicitly race-based explanation for its peremptory 
challenge against venireperson Brown, an African 
American: 
She works at McDonald's . . . . 
[McDonald's employees] have a tendency 
in fast-food restaurants to deal with-in lot 
of areas minority groups, legals, illegals. 
There may be some sympathies that are 
there one way or the other. 
(VII R. at 49.) The record demonstrates that appellant is a 
member of a racial minority. I simply cannot read the 
prosecution's comment as being race-neutral and thus 
conclude the trial court's decision violates Batson. 
Hernandez, involving a peremptory challenge to 
venirepersons because of their language skills, holds that 
any race-neutral reason meets the prosecution's |*25] 
second-step burden. This case, by contrast, simply does not 
involve a race-neutral reason. n7 In United States v. 
Bishop, 959 F.2d820, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth 
Circuit holds unconstitutional a peremptory challenge 
based on a venireperson's "sympathy for minorities" arising 
from her residence in a minority neighborhood. Bishop 
declares the prosecutor's proffered reason "amounted to 
little more than the assumption that one who lives in an 
area heavily populated by poor black people could not 
fairly try a black defendant." Id. at 825. Contrary to the 
majority's contention, Bishop struck down the same reason 
the prosecution proffered in the instant case—"sympathy 
for minorities"-and thus is not distinguishable on its facts. 
With its holding today, the majority creates a circuit split 
in this area of Batson jurisprudence. 
n7 This case is also easily distinguishable from 
the other cases cited by the majority in support of 
the constitutionality of "peremptory challenges 
based upon the employment of the juror." (Maj. 
Order at 9.) None of those cases uphold 
peremptory challenges for which a party proffered 
a race-based reason. 
1*26] 
Most importantly, I am troubled by the short shrift the 
majority opinion accords to the core constitutional 
concerns underlying Batson. The instant case differs 
factually from Batson only in that the prosecution has 
challenged the venireperson, an African American, because 
of her sympathies for minorities, not because she is herself 
a minority. That factual difference does not render the 
government's explanation constitutionally acceptable. See 
Bishop, 959F.2dat825-26. Under the majority's approach, 
Batson is stripped of all practical significance: To justify 
the exercise of peremptory challenges, parties seeking to 
exclude minority venirepersons from juries, in deliberate 
contravention of the Supreme Court's Batson 
jurisprudence, henceforth need offer only "sympathy for 
minorities," by virtue of residence, family connections, or 
place of employment, as a transparent proxy for 
venirepersons' race, thereby eviscerating '"the very idea of 
a jury . . . composed of the peers or equals of the 
[defendant]; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, [and] 
associates.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (quoting Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879)) 
[*27] (further citation omitted). n8 
n8 That is not to say that the principle of 
Batson race-neutrality need be taken to absurd 
extremes, for example, to prohibit the striking of a 
venireperson who professes the intent to nullify 
with respect to minority jurors. Cf. Heno v. 
Sprint/UnitedManagment Co., 208F.3d847, 2000 
U.S. App. LEXIS 6124 (10th Cir. 2000) (slip op.) 
(Seymour, Chief Circuit Judge, concurring) 
(discussing the scope of the constitutional concerns 
underlying Batson and Hernandez). But we do not 
face that situation in the present case, in which 
there is no allegation that venireperson Brown had 
any such intention. 
I would remand for a new trial. 
